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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the effect of ownership type on costs in microfinance 
institutions. The study utilize panel data containing information from 403 microfinance 
institutions in 74 countries. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was applied to 
generate the results. This thesis focuses on how different ownership types, non-profit 
organizations, shareholder-firms and cooperatives affect operating costs, employee cost and 
personnel productivity. The main results of the analyses is that there are no significant 
differences in neither operating costs, employee costs nor personnel productivity between non-
profit and shareholder owned microfinance institutions. These results contradict the suggestions 
from ownership and agency cost theory, which proposes that shareholder owned firms should 
display lower costs than non-profit firms.  
Another result that contradicts the suggestions of ownership and agency theory relates to 
cooperative microfinance institutions. While theory propose that cooperatives should have 
lower costs than shareholder owned firms, cooperatives display lower operating costs, 
employee cost and personnel productivity, but the effect on the latter two fades with the 
inclusion of control variables. The effect on operating costs is consistent through the different 
model specifications.  
A lack of exogeneity in the explanatory variables limits the confidence in the study’s ability to 
determine causal effects. The results of the study are therefore of a suggestive rather than 
conclusive nature. Nevertheless, the study is a new contribution to the debate on ownership 
costs in microfinance institutions, and can serve as a starting point for further research on the 
topic. In addition to the academic relevance, the results of the study may have implications for 
several other stakeholders in the microfinance industry, such as managers, investors and policy 
makers. 
 1 
Contents 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. 4 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ 6 
LIST OF VARIABLES .......................................................................................................... 7 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 8 
 MOTIVATION .............................................................................................................. 8 
1.1.1 Cost in Microfinance ........................................................................................ 8 
1.1.2 Ownership Costs ............................................................................................. 10 
1.1.3 Implications for Stakeholders, Policy Makers and Researchers .................... 11 
 OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................ 11 
 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................... 12 
 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ...................................................................................... 13 
2. THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY ....................................................................... 14 
 THE CONCEPT OF MICROFINANCE ............................................................................. 14 
 HISTORICAL SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 15 
 CRITICISM ................................................................................................................. 17 
 MICROFINANCE CHARACTERISTICS .......................................................................... 18 
2.4.1 Clients ............................................................................................................. 18 
2.4.2 Providers ........................................................................................................ 18 
 PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ........................................................................................ 20 
2.5.1 Credit Services ................................................................................................ 20 
2.5.2 Savings ............................................................................................................ 21 
2.5.3 Social and Nonfinancial Services ................................................................... 21 
2.5.4 Insurance, Payment Cards and Payment Services ......................................... 21 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION ................................................. 23 
 OWNERSHIP THEORY ................................................................................................ 23 
3.1.1 Cost of Contracting ......................................................................................... 24 
3.1.2 Cost of Ownership .......................................................................................... 25 
 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES ........................................................................................ 26 
3.2.1 Shareholding Firms (Investor-Owned Firms) ................................................ 26 
3.2.2 Non-profit organizations ................................................................................ 27 
3.2.3 Cooperatives ................................................................................................... 29 
 2
 THEORY OF THE PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (AGENCY COSTS) ..................................... 29 
 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ................................................................................... 31 
 HYPHOTHESES .......................................................................................................... 32 
3.5.1 Hypothesis number 1 ...................................................................................... 32 
3.5.2 Hypothesis number 2 ...................................................................................... 33 
3.5.3 Hypothesis number 3 ...................................................................................... 33 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 35 
 RESEARCH METHOD ................................................................................................. 35 
 DATA COLLECTION & SAMPLE ................................................................................. 36 
 ECONOMETRIC MODELS ........................................................................................... 38 
4.3.1 Pooled OLS ..................................................................................................... 39 
4.3.2 Panel Data Models ......................................................................................... 40 
 VARIABLES PRESENTATION ...................................................................................... 42 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables....................................................................................... 42 
4.4.2 Ownership Variables ...................................................................................... 44 
4.4.3 Control Variables ........................................................................................... 44 
 MODEL PRESENTATION ............................................................................................ 49 
 DATA ANALYSING TOOLS ......................................................................................... 50 
5. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ........................................................................ 51 
 EVALUATION OF POOLED OLS ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................... 51 
5.1.1 Contemporaneous Exogeneity (POLS1) ......................................................... 51 
5.1.2 Multicollinearity (POLS2) .............................................................................. 52 
5.1.3 Homoscedasticity (POLS3a) and Serial Correlation (POLS3b) .................... 52 
 ADDITIONS FOR RANDOM EFFECTS .......................................................................... 52 
5.2.1 Testing for Random Effects versus OLS ......................................................... 52 
5.2.2 Strict Exogeneity ............................................................................................. 53 
5.2.3 Correlation between Explanatory Variables and the Unobserved Effect ....... 53 
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ......................................................................................... 53 
5.3.1 Dependent Variables....................................................................................... 58 
5.3.2 Ownership Variables ...................................................................................... 61 
5.3.3 Control Variables ........................................................................................... 61 
 REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................. 69 
 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ............................................................................................... 78 
5.5.1 Random Effects Analysis ................................................................................. 78 
5.5.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis (OLS)...................................................................... 82 
 SUMMARY OF THE MODELS ...................................................................................... 88 
 3 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 89 
7.      REFERENCES. ........................................................................................................... 91 
8. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 97 
 APPENDIX 1. RESULTS FROM TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY ................................ 97 
 APPENDIX 2. RESULTS FROM BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST ........................................... 101 
 APPENDIX 3. RESULTS OF THE RANDOM EFFECTS ANALYSES ............................... 102 
 APPENDIX 4. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS & P-VALUES ................................................. 103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 4
List of Tables 
Table 1 – Overall Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................. 54 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics per Ownership Type ............................................................. 56 
Table 3 - OEP Models Estimated with Pooled OLS .............................................................. 69 
Table 4 - Personnel Cost Models Estimated with Pooled OLS .............................................. 72 
Table 5 - Personnel Productivity Models Estimated with Pooled OLS ................................. 75 
Table 6 - OEP Models Estimated with Random Effects ........................................................ 78 
Table 7 - Personnel Cost Models Estimated with Random Effects ....................................... 79 
Table 8 - Personnel Productivity Models Estimated with Random Effects ........................... 81 
Table 9 - OEP Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis ................................................................ 83 
Table 10 - Personnel Cost Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis .............................................. 84 
Table 11 - Personnel Productivity Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis ................................. 86 
Table 12 - Summary of the Results ........................................................................................ 88 
Table A-1 - Multicollinearity Test in OEP Models ................................................................ 97 
Table A-2 - Multicollinearity in Personnel Cost Models ....................................................... 98 
Table A-3 - Multicollinearity in Personnel Productivity Models .......................................... 99 
Table A-4 - Results from Breusch-Pagan Test ..................................................................... 101 
Table A-5 - Results of the Hausman Test ............................................................................ 102 
Table A-6 - Explanatory Power of the Random Effect Models ........................................... 103 
 
 5 
List of Figures  
Figure 1 - Microfinance Providers ......................................................................................... 19 
Figure 2 - Observations per Ownership Type ........................................................................ 37 
Figure 3 - Observations per Geographical Region ................................................................. 38 
Figure 4 - Distribution of the OEP Ratio ............................................................................... 58 
Figure 5 - Distribution of Personnel Cost .............................................................................. 59 
Figure 6 - Distribution of Personnel Productivity .................................................................. 60 
Figure 7 - Distribution of Ownership Types .......................................................................... 61 
Figure 8 - Distribution of Competition ................................................................................... 62 
Figure 9 - Distribution of Savings-to-Asset Ratio .................................................................. 63 
Figure 10 - Distribution of Size .............................................................................................. 64 
Figure 11 - Distribution of Age .............................................................................................. 65 
Figure 12 - Distribution of Loan Outstanding Average ......................................................... 66 
Figure 13 - Distribution of the Economic Freedom Index ..................................................... 67 
Figure 14 - Distribution of the Human Development Index .................................................. 68 
 
  
 6
List of Abbreviations 
MFI   Microfinance Institution 
NPO   Non-profit Organization 
SHF   Shareholder owned Firm 
COOP    Cooperative Microfinance Institution 
NGO   Non-governmental Organization 
NBFI   Non-bank Financial Institution 
CGAP The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. A global partnership of 34 
organizations that seek to advance financial inclusion 
MIX   The Microfinance Information Exchange 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
POLS   Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
FD   First Differencing 
FE   Fixed Effects 
RE   Random Effects 
VIF   Variance Inflation Factor 
USD   US Dollars 
IPO   Initial Public Offering 
  
 7 
List of Variables 
OEP   Ratio of Operational Expense to Average Outstanding Portfolio 
CostEmployee Personnel Cost per Employee 
PersProd  Personnel Productivity. Measured as Credit clients per Employee 
NPO   Non-profit Organization 
SHF   Shareholder owned Firm 
COOP    Cooperative Microfinance Institution 
InternAudit  Internal Auditor reporting to the Board of Directors 
PerformancePay System for remunerating employees according to their performance 
Competition  Measure of the level of competition in the area where the MFI operate 
Regulation  Indicate whether the MFI is regulated by banking authorities 
SA Savings to Assets ratio. Measured as voluntary savings relative to total 
assets of the MFI 
VB   Village Banking Lending Methodology 
SG   Solidarity Groups Lending Methodology 
Individual  Individual Loans 
Asia   Regional dummy for Asia 
AFR   Regional dummy for Africa 
MENA  Regional dummy for Middle East and Northern Africa 
LA   Regional dummy for Latin America 
EECA    Regional dummy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
LOA   Loan Outstanding Average 
EF   Economic Freedom Index. Provided by The Heritage Foundation 
HDI Human Development Index. Provided by the United Nations 
Development Program 
 
 8
1. Introduction 
The introduction chapter will start out with providing the motivation behind this thesis. 
Subsequently, the objective and scope of the study will be presented, before a presentation of 
the structure of the thesis concludes the chapter. 
 Motivation 
1.1.1 Cost in Microfinance 
Microfinance describes the provision of financial services to poor and low-income clients have 
little or no access to conventional banks (Rosenberg, Gonzalez, & Narain, 2009). From being 
a narrow, donor dependent activity, microfinance is today a global industry with an estimated 
$73 billion in loans outstanding, serving about 200 million clients (Cull, Navajas, Nishida, & 
Zeiler, 2015). Microfinance has been considered a powerful tool for sustainable development 
(Lützenkirchen & Weistoffer, 2012). This view has however been challenged by academic 
researchers. Although Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015) find some positive effects related 
to microfinance, they find no clear evidence that microfinance lead to improvements in social 
indicators, such as a reduction in poverty or increased living standards.  
Historically, poverty alleviation were tied to productive loans issued to microenterprises only. 
However, there has been a recognition that access to capital is only one of the inputs required 
to stimulate economic development and poverty alleviation. Furthermore, there is an 
acknowledgement that the poor requires financial services for a variety of reasons, such as 
consumption and income smoothing (Ledgerwood, Earne, & Nelson, 2013). 
Traditionally, donor backed organizations with idealistic motivation have dominated the 
industry, but there is a trend of microfinance institutions (MFIs) gradually becoming more 
self-financed. This trend is reinforced by the entrance of commercial banks, which has 
challenged the donor backed MFIs (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Rhyne & Otero, 2006).  
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To meet the new challenges in the microfinance industry, policy makers1 have advocated the 
transformation of non-profit MFIs to shareholder owned firms (SHFs). Policy makers 
advocating transformation of non-profit MFIs highlight profitability and sustainability as 
factors that favors organizational change. They also claim that shareholders with incentives to 
improve governance will result in better performing MFIs (Christen, Lyman, & Rosenberg, 
2003; Fernando, 2004; Jansson, Rosales, & Westley, 2004) Non-profit MFIs will henceforth 
be referred to by the abbreviation NPO2 (Non-Profit Organization). 
Measuring performance in MFIs is a challenge. The diversity of ownership types in the 
microfinance industry provides a sample of organizations that seek different objectives. A 
common measure of performance in other industries is profitability. Using this to measure 
performance in the microfinance industry is a problem, as a large fraction of the firms are non-
profit organizations, who per definition do not maximize, or even generate profits. Obviously, 
these firms are driven by other objectives than profit maximization.  
MFIs are often acquainted with a dual objective; the first one is financial sustainability, and 
the second is to improve their outreach (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). Outreach is used to 
describe MFIs efforts to service an ever-wider audience and to reach the poorest of the poor 
(Conning, 1999). The objectives of outreach and financial sustainability are both affected by 
MFIs costs. While MFIs prioritize profit maximization differently, cost minimization is 
important for all types of MFIs, independent of objectives.  
For profit minded MFIs, costs are directly linked to profit, as a reduction in costs would 
increase profits, if all other factors were held constant. Profits are essential for MFIs in order 
to attract investors. If the microfinance industry cannot attract investors, the sustainability of 
the industry may be threatened. To increase profit and improve financial sustainability, 
literature suggests that microfinance institutions should focus on cost efficiency (Hermes, 
Lensink, & Meesters, 2011; Mersland, 2009).  
                                                 
1 Policymakers are development agencies and other institutions consulting MFIs to achieve financial inclusion. Examples of 
such policymakers are The World Bank, CGAP and The Inter-American Development Bank. Government and Parliament are 
also policymakers, but these are not recognized in this thesis.  
2 Non-profit organizations are not to be confused with Non-governmental Organizations, even though these terms are often 
used interchangeably. NPOs are defined by their ownership structure, while NGOs are defined by their legal organizational 
status. Nevertheless, NPOs are often NGOs, and NGOs are always NPOs. 
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The second objective, outreach, affects MFIs in the way that a high cost level will hamper the 
MFI’s possibilities to expand their outreach and provide financial services to a larger share of 
the world’s poor. In MFIs, costs are the largest contributor to interest rates (Rosenberg et al., 
2009). Accordingly, having a high cost level will affect the MFIs outreach indirectly, as high 
interest rates could exclude the poorest from access to the microfinance services. 
Costs implications on profitability and outreach emphasize costs relevance as a measure of 
performance in microfinance institutions. Following the arguments from the preceding 
paragraphs, MFIs should have incentives to control costs regardless of their focus on financial 
sustainability or outreach. 
1.1.2 Ownership Costs 
Along with the evolution of the microfinance industry, the scope of organizational forms in 
the industry has become broader. Today, the organizational forms that dominate the industry 
are non-profit organizations, shareholder-owned firms and cooperatives. These are 
organizational forms with different structures, and incentives (Hansmann, 1996). Agency 
theory suggests that different ownership structures could lead to differences in cost structures, 
as the incentives in an organization is highly affected by the organizational legal status 
(Mersland, 2011).  
The focus on transforming MFIs from non-profit organizations to shareholder owned firms 
provides additional motivation for examining the ownership costs of MFIs. As policy papers 
argue for MFIs to transform from NPOs (Fernando, 2004; Rhyne, 2001; White & Campion, 
2002), there seems to be a need for studies examining the effect of different ownership types. 
In particular, they emphasize that NPOs are less commercial and professional because they 
lack owners with pecuniary incentives to monitor the management. The policy documents also 
highlight SHFs’ superior governance mechanisms, and the ability to be regulated by banking 
authorities, accept deposits and attract private equity (Mersland, 2009).  
On the other hand, there is also literature suggesting that SHFs do not outperform NPOs 
(Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 2004; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). The divergence in these 
studies call for additional research. 
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1.1.3 Implications for Stakeholders, Policy Makers and Researchers 
Several stakeholders have an interest in a deeper knowledge of the relationship between the 
ownership structure and costs of MFIs. The first group is the MFIs themselves. Why cost 
efficiency is of interest has already been discussed, and greater knowledge could help MFIs 
take actions to reduce their costs in order to fulfill their objectives. 
The cost of ownership in MFIs is also relevant for policy makers. If SHFs display lower costs 
than other MFIs, then this would add substance to the argument favoring transformation of 
non-profit organizations into SHFs. On the other hand, if ownership types are not associated 
with cost differences, one of the arguments for advocating such a transformation disappear.  
The added insight could also be useful for donors and investors in forming their MFIs into 
more profitable and effective organizations. Alternatively, the insight could result in a 
redistribution of funds from poorly performing MFIs toward MFIs that use their capital more 
efficiently. 
Ultimately, academic researchers in the field of microfinance should also find this topic 
intriguing. We extend the work of Mersland (2009) on the ownership types and costs and 
provides new insight to this topic by examining the relation between ownership structures and 
employee costs. This study also responds to the need for more knowledge on corporate 
governance in MFIs (Hilton, 2008).  
 Objective  
The main objective of this thesis is to examine ownership type effects on costs in microfinance 
organizations. The study is designed to provide comprehensive insight into the relation 
between ownership type and costs by including elements from principal-agent theory and 
governance mechanisms.  
By applying general economic ownership theory on microfinance, this study aims to add new 
insight to the relation between ownership and cost. According to ownership theory, the 
intrinsic differences among non-profit organizations and shareholder firms should lead to 
differences in cost structures and governance. 
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Even though the aim of this study is to identify a causal relationship between ownership form 
and costs, the prerequisites for interpreting results causally is not satisfied. The problems of 
interpreting the results causally stems from endogeneity problems in the data. Firstly, a critical 
prerequisite for causal interpretation is that the explanatory variable affects the dependent 
variable. This is not satisfied, as the possibility of a reverse effect cannot be excluded. The 
causality may run from the dependent variable to the explanatory variable or both ways 
simultaneously. Secondly, relevant variables may be omitted from the models. This would 
lead estimates to be biased, and causal interpretation would be biased as well. Due to these 
weaknesses, the results of this study are of a suggestive rather than conclusive nature. Further 
research is needed to confirm the results. 
In addition to suggesting possible causal relationships, descriptive findings are reported and 
commented. Descriptive research does not try to answer questions of causality, but is limited 
to describing characteristics of a population. The descriptive analysis has a value in itself, but 
can also motivate further research on the causal relations behind the observed characteristics. 
 Scope and limitations 
According to Schreiner (2002), there is six aspects of social benefits for microfinance clients. 
All of which can be considered performance dimensions for the MFIs. The six aspects are 
cost, depth, breadth, length, scope and worth.  In this thesis, we concentrate on the one 
dimension of cost, and rarely comment on other aspects of MFI performance.  
In evaluating the effect of ownership types on MFI costs, we focus on operational costs, 
measured by operational expenses. Financial costs and loan losses contribute to the total costs 
of MFIs, but are not considered in this study. 
The study examines the effect of ownership on operational expenses in general, and personnel 
costs specifically. In addition, personnel productivity is included to supplement the result from 
the study of personnel cost.  
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 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the microfinance 
industry, before the economic theory and our hypotheses are presented in chapter 3. Chapter 
4 presents the research methodology, and chapter 5 provides the empirical analyses. 
Concluding remarks are made in chapter 6. 
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2.  The Microfinance Industry 
This chapter gives an overview of the microfinance industry, and includes the concept, history 
and definitions of microfinance. A more in-detail description of the industry’s participants, 
products and services, trends and criticism is also provided in this chapter. 
 The concept of microfinance 
Microfinance is based on the idea that low-income individuals, who lack access to financial 
services through the ordinary formal financial sector, will benefit from being offered financial 
services. In areas without ordinary financial services, informal moneylenders who provides 
access to money at high cost, is the main source of capital. The interest rates that these 
moneylenders charge are many times the monthly effective rates charged by sustainable 
financial institutions. Even after real, inflation adjusted, interest rates are used and transaction 
costs are included, it is normally far less expensive to borrow from a financial institution than 
from an informal moneylender3. The microfinance institutions also provide services that 
combine security, liquidity and returns (Robinson, 2001). These financial services may be 
savings and credit, and in some cases insurance and payment services. Microfinance 
distinguishes itself from ordinary banking by the intention of being a development tool as well 
as being a financial service (Ledgerwood, 1999).  
A recognized definition of microfinance is the one of Robinson (2001): “Microfinance is 
defined as small-scale financial services -primarily credit and savings- provided to individuals 
and groups at the local levels of developing countries, both rural and urban” (p. 9).  
The definition only covers the financial objective, and ignores the developing focus of 
microfinance. However, this definition corresponds well to this thesis as the focus is set on 
MFIs’ financial sustainability, not outreach.  
Microfinance usually involves small loans, which are typically intended to be working capital. 
The access to larger loans are generally based on the clients’ repayment performance. Besides 
offering financial services, several MFIs also offer social intermediation such as group 
formation, development of self-confidence and training in financial literacy and management 
                                                 
3 Surprisingly, when microfinance institutions enter a new market and offer financial services at lower cost, informal 
moneylenders continue to service some fraction of the demand for credit. A possible explanation for this may be that informal 
moneylenders are more flexible than institutional credit providers (Pearlman, 2010).  
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capabilities among members of a group. This implies that microfinance serves both financial 
and social intermediation (Ledgerwood, 1999).  
Microfinance got worldwide attention in the beginning of the 21st century. The UN designated 
2005 as the International Year of Microcredit with the objectives “to unite Member States, UN 
Agencies and Microfianance partners in their shared interest to build sustainable and inclusive 
financial sectors and achieve the Millienium Development Goals” (UN, 2005). In 2006, the 
Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. This spurred great 
enthusiasm for the industry.  
Today, the microfinance industry has moved toward providing low-income people with 
convenient and reasonably prized financial services. As microfinance has developed from 
microcredit into financial institutions who provides a broad range of financial products, 
some argue that microfinance is an outdated term. They point out that microfinance has 
evolved from being a small financial assistant into becoming a commercial industry 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Helms, 2006). The microfinance institutions’ ability to 
attract investments from the private sector is an example of how the industry are moving 
towards being more commercial (Cull, Demirg-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009).  
As of 2011 only three IPOs had been carried out in the microfinance industry, but two of 
them were more than 13 times oversubscribed (Ledgerwood et al., 2013). This indicates a 
large interest for making equity investments in the microfinance industry. 
 Historical summary 
Even though many consider Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank as pioneers in the area 
of financial inclusion, the history of providing financial services to the poor stretches further 
back than the 1970s. Small, informal savings and credit group had been operating for several 
centuries all over the globe, and more formal institutions had also existed. The 18th century 
Irish Loan Fund system is often held forward as a precursor of modern microfinance. In 
Norway, parallels are drawn to the emergence of the local savings banks in the 1800s 
(Mersland, 2011). 
Nevertheless, microfinance as we know it today emerged in the 1970s, when the term 
microcredit was coined. Pioneers like Grameen Bank and ACCION International started 
issuing small loans to women who in turn invested in their microenterprises. In the 1980s, 
Bank Rakayat Indonesia was among the first institutions to defy conventional wisdom 
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regarding financial services for the poor. They set interest rates that covered the bank’s costs, 
and focused on a high level of repayment. This strategy enabled the microcredit institutions to 
expand their business and serve a vast number of clients. Microfinance was introduced as an 
integral part of the overall financial system, which led to a shift in the focus from providing 
the population with subsidized loans into building up local, sustainable institutions to serve 
the poor (CGAP, 2006). 
As the organizations providing microcredit changed the array of services offered, 
microfinance replaced microcredit as the term used to describe serving financial services to 
the poor during the early 1990s. Savings, insurances and money transfers were more frequently 
offered by the MFIs. During this decade, one could also observe the first transformation from 
a non-profit to a for-profit commercial bank when Banco Sol was established based on the 
non-profit PRODEM in Bolivia. This exemplifies microfinance as a business of continuous 
development, which has emerged from being an industry of donor-driven organizations into 
consisting of both commercialized MFIs and commercial banks. These institutions have 
started to see the potential of combining profit with fighting poverty (CGAP, 2006). There is 
a realization towards that the large scale provision of microfinance to the poor, can be 
sustainable over time in financial self-sufficient commercial institutions in the regulated 
financial sector (Robinson, 2001). 
There has been two paradigm shifts in the microfinance history. Until the 1980s microfinance 
concentrated on so-called agricultural-credit, or credit subsidized by government or donors to 
small-scale farmers. In the 1980s, the focus shifted to the poor, and there was a realization of 
the problem with asymmetric information and high transaction costs. Building cost-efficient 
MFIs became a focus. The second paradigm shift took place in the mid-2000, when the focus 
shifted from microfinance to inclusive finance. This was a shift from focusing on supporting 
discrete MFIs and initiatives into building financial sectors (CGAP, 2006). 
Today the focus is on microfinance clients, and the recognition that access to capital is only 
one of the inputs required for economic development and poverty alleviation. The language 
of microfinance has changed according to the shifting focus in the industry. Initially 
microcredit became microfinance with the realization that microfinance clients needed savings 
services. Today, with the focus on outreach and providing a large scale of services, terms like 
inclusive finance, access to finance, financial ecosystems and financial inclusion is used 
(Ledgerwood et al., 2013). 
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 Criticism 
The microfinance industry’s potential to alleviate poverty has been investigated by academics 
ever since the creation of the first MFIs. Karnani (2008) claims that initiatives to increase 
employment and productivity, through for example government initiatives are more effective 
than to push poor people into entrepreneurship. In his study on flagship programs in 
Bangladesh, Morduch (1998) finds that microfinance has a marginal positive impact on 
consumption and male schooling, but negative marginal impact on labor supply.  
Both opponents and defenders of microfinance have relied heavily on correlations, and 
circumstantial evidence in their argumentation. As a response to this, the later years have seen 
an increase in studies with a higher focus on research designs that allow for causal 
interpretation. Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015) presents the overall results of six studies 
that to a greater extent than earlier research contains an element of randomness. This 
randomness allow for a greater level of causal interpretation. The results of the six studies are 
consistent and state that there is little evidence to support transformative effects, such as 
reductions in poverty or improvements in living standards. However, the studies also coincide 
in refuting harmful effects of microfinance. Even though there is little support for the strongest 
claims of microfinance, the studies support some positive effects of microfinance, exemplified 
by occupational choice, business scale and female decision power.  
As the microfinance industry has grown, the focus has shifted from a social movement to the 
integration of microfinance in the formal financial sector. This integration has led to conflict, 
as some argue that pursuing commercial objectives leads to a mission drift in microfinance 
(Ghosh & Van Tassel, 2011). The IPO listing of the Mexican bank Banco Compartamos, 
where shareholders sold 30 % of their existing stockholdings and realized large profits, is held 
forward as an example of mission drift. The critics of microfinance points at this example to 
demonstrate that MFIs generate profits on the back of poor people, in order to enrich their 
investors, and thus compromise the movement’s idealistic principles (Ledgerwood, 2006). 
The Microfinance industry is also criticized in the popular press.  The Danish journalist Tom 
Heinemann drew attention to the possibility of debt-traps caused by microfinance, resulting 
from aggressive lending policies. His documentary “Fanget i Mikrogjeld” received great 
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attention (Sinclair, 2012). Milford Bateman4, who also warned about the negative outcomes 
of microfinance, supports this criticism. He pointed to the potential creation of poverty traps 
and inferior development effect of microfinance compared to other development tools 
(Bateman & Chang, 2012).  
 Microfinance characteristics 
2.4.1 Clients 
Microfinance institutions extends loans to more than 200 million clients (Cull, Navajas, 
Nishida, & Zeiler, 2015). As mentioned in the definition given by MIX, microfinance is 
provided to poor and low-income clients, however it is common to distinguish the poor and 
low-income people from the poorest of the poor. MFIs usually do not serve the latter group, 
and microfinance clients are typically self-employed, low-income entrepreneurs in both rural 
and urban areas. The clients are often traders, street vendors, small farmers, services providers, 
artisans and small producers. The activities that these clients are involved in usually provide 
a stable source of income, which enables them to down pay the loan and make a decent living 
(Ledgerwood, 1999).  According to data from provided by MIX, Latin America and East Asia 
is the two biggest markets for microfinance when ranked by loan portfolio (Convergences, 
2013). 
2.4.2 Providers 
Microfinance organizations (MFIs) can take different organizational forms. The MFIs can be 
non-governmental organizations, credit unions, financial cooperatives, government banks, 
commercial banks, or nonbank financial institutions (Ledgerwood, 1999).  
There is a broad scope of microfinance providers. Usually, the MFIS are presented along a 
continuum representing their level of formality. The MFIs level of formality is dependent on 
the sophistication of the organizational structure and governance, and the degree of oversight 
or supervision by governments (Helms, 2006). The informal sector consist of friends and 
family, moneylenders, pawnbrokers, community savings clubs, deposit collectors, traders and 
agricultural input providers. This sector represent the most common channel for poor people 
                                                 
4 Dr Milford Bateman is a freelance consultant and visiting professor at the University of Juraj 
Dobrila, Pula, Croatia. He is one of the most prominent criticizers of microfinance. 
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to raise capital. The informal providers stands out from the formal providers by having a 
simpler organizational structure and for being unsupervised (Helms, 2006). 
Figure 1 - Microfinance Providers 
 
Note: ROSCAs = rotating savings and credit associations, ASCAs = accumulating savings 
and credit associations; CVECAs = Caisses Villageoises d’Epargne et de Crédit Autogérées; 
FSAs = financial service associations; SHG = self-help groups; NGOs = nongovernmental 
organizations; NBFI = nonbank financial institution (Helms, 2006). 
NGOs are organizations that are between the informal and the formal financial institutions. 
Historically, they have been central in the development of microfinance, as they often 
concentrate on serving a social mission. Donors finance most of the NGOs, which limits their 
ability to bring in capital. Given the social mission of reaching the poor clients, microfinance 
NGOs are often characterized by issuing small loans, and to have high operational costs 
(Helms, 2006). 
The formal financial institutions are chartered by the government and are also subject to 
banking regulations and supervision (Ledgerwood, 1999). In the microfinance business, these 
providers consists of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), state-owned banks, postal 
banks, rural banks, specialized MFI banks and full-service commercial banks. These 
institutions provide most financial services, and play an important role in making financial 
services inclusive in the poor areas of the world. However, these institutions have a history of 
being reluctant to serve the poorest of the poor (Helms, 2006). 
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Financial cooperatives are member-owned financial service providers, also called savings and 
credit cooperatives, savings and loan associations or credit unions. Financial cooperatives are 
organized and operated according to general cooperatives principals; no external shareholders, 
the members are the owners and each members has the right to one vote (Ledgerwood et al., 
2013). When referring to cooperatives in this thesis, we are speaking of financial cooperatives 
with the characteristics presented above. A more in-depth presentation of cooperatives is 
provided in chapter 3.2.3. 
 Products and services 
The MFIs mainly provide financial services to their customers. However, some MFIs also 
provide non-financial services. In the following, a short presentation of the most common 
services that MFIs offer is provided. 
2.5.1 Credit Services 
The MFIs provide credit to poor people that normally would not have access to the formal 
financial market. Loans are mainly intended for productive purposes which aim to stimulate 
entrepreneurship in poor regions. Nonetheless, microfinance loans are also issued for 
consumption, housing and other purposes. It is common to divide loans into two groups, 
individual loans and group-based loans. Individual loans are provided to individuals based on 
their ability to provide the MFI with assurances of repayment and some level of security.  
Group loans are provided to clients that are difficult and expensive to reach. As group lending 
reduces the transaction costs and risk to providers, many group-lending programs target the 
very poor, as they do not have sufficient debt capacity, nor collateral or credit history. Group 
based loans are either given to one groups as a loan, to individuals that are part of a group, or 
to groups who then on-lend individually to the members. Group lending can be subcategorized 
as Solidarity Groups or Village Banking. The latter is characterized by larger groups and 
stricter focus on joint liability of the individuals in the group, than solidarity groups have. 
Solidarity groups normally consist of three to 10 people, each guaranteeing each other’s 
individual loans, while a village bank consist of 15 to 50 people that makes individual loans 
to the members of the village bank (Ledgerwood et al., 2013).  
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2.5.2 Savings 
The ability to place money and the possibility to earn returns on savings is a valued service 
for the world’s poor. According to The World Bank’s “Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance 
Institutions (2001), the largest and most sustainable banks rely heavily on savings 
mobilization. It is common to distinguish between compulsory and voluntary savings. 
Compulsory savings are not generally available for withdrawal while a loan is outstanding. In 
this way, compulsory savings act as a form of collateral, which implies that it should be 
considered as a part of the loan, rather than an actual savings product (Ledgerwood et al., 
2013).  
The voluntary savings provide people with the possibility to save money in the MFI. Although 
there obviously are positive effects of providing people with the possibility to save money, 
such as return on savings, smoothing of consumption and secure savings, there are some clear 
caveats related to this as well. The administrative complexity that comes with offering saving 
services, and the high risk exposed to clients, as MFIs uses savings to fund unsafe lending 
operations, are the most prevalent disadvantages (Ledgerwood et al., 2013). 
2.5.3 Social and Nonfinancial Services 
Some MFIs offer social services such as education, literacy, health and nutrition programs.  
The intent behind these services is to make it easier to establish sustainable financial 
intermediation with the poor in societies with high level of social capital. However, there are 
problems involved in providing both financial and social services, one being the conflicting 
interests that comes with providing two separate services. Another problem is the difficulty of 
identifying and controlling the costs per service, which makes it difficult to measure the self-
sufficiency of the financial services (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
2.5.4 Insurance, Payment Cards and Payment Services 
As the market for financial services has emerged, insurance has evolved as a product offered 
more extensively by the MFIs. This springs from the growing demand among clients on life 
and health insurance, as well as insurance of property, livestock and agriculture (Ledgerwood 
et al., 2013). 
Payment cards are to some extent offered by MFIs, but the lack of adequate infrastructure is 
an obvious constraint to the propagation. However, payment cards offer a great opportunity 
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for MFIs to minimize administration and operating costs and streamline operations. Payment 
services includes check cashing and check writing, and the transfer and remittance of funds 
from one area to another (Ledgerwood, 1999). Related to these services is mobile banking, 
which has spread rapidly in developing countries, since the challenges of providing reliable 
broadband access in these areas favor mobile technology (Ledgerwood et al., 2013). The SMS-
based money transfer system, M-PESA has grown rapidly, reaching approximately 65 percent 
of Kenyan households only two years after being launched (Kumar, McKay, & Parker, 2010; 
Suri & Jack, 2011). Despite the fact that mobile banking is limited to money transfers and 
payments, it has a recognized potential to serve as a cheap and effective delivery channel for 
MFIs (Kumar, McKay, & Parker, 2010).  
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3. Theory and hypothesis formulation 
In this chapter, we first present economic theory on ownership. Based on this we will assess 
general differences between investor-owned firms, non-profits and cooperatives. We will also 
present theory on agency costs and governance mechanisms, before we arrive at hypothesis 
formulations. All of the presented theories are general economic theories and not specific for 
the microfinance industry, but we will apply this to the microfinance industry when 
formulating hypotheses to test and analyse. 
 Ownership Theory 
In the following, the term firm is used to describe companies and institutions, even though 
organization may be a more appropriate phrase in some situations. The term patron is utilized 
as a common term for all individuals and firms that are in a transactional relationship with the 
firm. 
Ownership is often referred to as a bundle of property rights (Demsetz, 1988). The owners of 
a firm are those patrons who share two formal rights: the formal right to control the firm, and 
the right to appropriate residual earnings (Hansmann, 1988).  
The firm in itself can be described as a nexus of contracts (Hendrikse, 2003; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In other words, the firm is a common signatory of a group of contracts. The 
counterparties are all patrons to whom the firm relates; investors, employees, customers, 
bondholders or others. In his seminal paper “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase, 1937), Ronald 
Coase describes how the establishment of a firm is a superior arrangement compared to the 
construction of numerous individual contracts. The argument is that it is too costly to use the 
price mechanism of the market, when the number of relations is very high. 
The contracts are restricting the firm’s actions. However, it would be extremely costly, and 
potentially impossible, to incorporate all possible eventualities of the future in contracts. 
Accordingly, the firm is left with some discretion within the boundaries of the contract. The 
right to exercise this discretion is the privilege of the firm’s owners. This right is an essential 
part of the control over the firm (Hansmann, 1996). 
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Generally, two different types of relationships can characterize all transactions of the firm. 
Hansmann (1996) denotes the first type as market contracting. In this transaction, contracts 
guides the relationship between the parties. No other mean of controlling the firms behavior 
is available than enforcement of the contract, or in the final instance, abruption of the 
transactional relationship.  
The second relationship, which is referred to simply as ownership (Hansmann, 1996), points 
to the situation where the party involved is also an owner of the firm. In this relationship, the 
patrons have the opportunity of controlling the firm’s behavior directly. The election of board 
members and the general assembly are mechanisms that allow the owners to control the firm 
directly.  
Both market contracting and ownership affect the costs of the firm. Assigning ownership to a 
class of patrons involves a trade-off between the costs and benefits for the patrons. In the 
following sections, we will present some of the costs associated with each relationship.  
3.1.1 Cost of Contracting 
The costs of contracting is essentially related to market power and asymmetric information.  
In a contractual relationship, one party may be in possession of substantial market power. The 
extreme case is when a monopoly exist. Microeconomic theory tells us that monopolies lead 
to deflated levels of production, which result in a deadweight loss (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
2009). Market power can also lead to inefficiencies in less extreme cases. For example, a firm 
may have market power in transacting with their customers in the output market. This may 
result in the customers paying a high price, which could hamper their ability to compete in 
their own output market. In a situation like this, the customers would have an interest in 
ownership of the firm, to avoid paying an excessive price for the products (Hansmann, 1988). 
Providers of inputs, including capital providers, and employees may also be prone to 
exploitation from the firm. 
Another variant of market power is denoted lock-in. When a patron enters into a contract with 
another, he constrains his own freedom. The arrangement leaves the firm with some degree of 
discretion, and the management can take actions that are less beneficial to the patron. The 
patron can seldom exit the relationship without incurring costs. The lock-in is particularly 
relevant when the patron has undertaken substantial specific investments in the firm. Training 
and education of employees may be examples of specific investments, which are hard to 
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retrieve when transferring ownership. Liquidity premiums in little traded stocks can also be 
an example of the cost of lock-in. If the patron owns the firm, the incentive for him to act 
opportunistically diminishes, because he is the residual claimant (Williamson, 1985).  
Asymmetric information describes the situation where one party has substantially more 
information about a factor affecting the terms of the relationship than the other party. When 
there is a substantial asymmetry in information, the informed part has an incentive to utilize 
this advantage. If this informed patron is also an owner, the incentive to behave 
opportunistically diminishes, because as an owner he is entitled to the residual earnings of the 
firm. In other words, the right to residual claims disciplines the patrons by aligning their 
incentives (Hansmann, 1988). 
3.1.2 Cost of Ownership 
From the previous sections, it seems like we can overcome costs resulting of market 
contracting by assigning ownership to the right group of patrons. However, ownership also 
involves costs. We will later discuss agency costs in more detail, but for now, it is considered 
sufficient to state that when owners are unable to perfectly observe and control management, 
and the two groups have somehow conflicting interests, such costs does exist. 
There are various types of ownership costs. Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by owners 
through getting informed about operations, communicating among themselves, and imposing 
their decisions on firm management.  
A related cost is the cost of managerial opportunism by the managers. The owners can to some 
degree trade off the costs of monitoring and the cost of managerial opportunism. If the owners 
choose a high level of monitoring to reduce the managers’ abilities to act opportunistically, 
the monitoring cost will be high. Conversely, reducing monitoring cost, and hence the 
effective control, permits the managers to pursue conflicting interests to a greater extent 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Different groups of patrons may differ in their ability to control 
management efficiently. Even though a group of patrons are unable to control management 
efficiently, it is not trivial to say that they are not potential owners. Agents that serve poorly 
may be preferred to agents who actively promotes the interest of other stakeholders in the firm 
(Hansmann, 1996).  
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When ownership is assigned to a group of patrons, the owners will incur costs of collective 
decision-making. There are two reasons why collective decision-making is costly. First, 
designing and agreeing on voting schemes is both time-consuming and costly, and individuals 
have incentive to form coalitions in order to achieve disproportionate influence. Secondly, 
when the owners have conflicting interest voting schemes will most times result in sub-optimal 
decisions for some fraction of the owners (Hansmann, 1988).  
The preceding sections relates to exercise of control, but there may also be costs related to the 
owner’s role as residual beneficiary. The reason is the risk associated with residual claims. 
Only when all other obligations are met, will the owners be entitled to any claim. Different 
patrons may have different abilities to carry this risk. Ability to reduce the overall risk through 
diversification, and relative risk aversion, may distinguish possible owners. Owners who can 
diversify risk at a low cost, and owners with a relatively low level of risk aversion, have low 
costs of risk bearing. 
 Ownership structures 
The following sections will present three different ownership forms based on the theory of 
ownership. 
3.2.1 Shareholding Firms (Investor-Owned Firms) 
In the following, we use the term investor to identify any patron supplying capital to the firm. 
The term includes outside providers of capital (lenders) and is therefore distinguished from 
the term owners. Ownership need not to be assigned to all investors. If it is, the firm will be 
fully equity financed.  
Shareholder-owned firms are characterized by investors who receive ownership privileges in 
exchange for the provision of capital to the firm. By assigning ownership to the investors, a 
firm may reduce its contracting costs. The firm may improve their incentive structure, and thus 
reduce the agency costs. They will however incur ownership costs (Hansmann, 1996).  
There are several benefits of assigning ownership to the investors of a firm. Investor ownership 
aligns incentives and protects investors from exploitation. Investors are prone to exploitation 
because owners will have incentives to act opportunistically. An example of such behavior is 
owners distributing excessive dividends or perquisites among themselves. This may reduce 
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the firm’s ability to repay its debt. Owners may also undertake high-risk projects that generate 
disproportionate gains for owners in the event of success, but impose disproportionate losses 
on the investors in the event of a failure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The lock-in effect 
contributes to this negative effect on investors, because if owners could easily withdraw their 
investments, the possible capital efflux would discipline the owners (Hansmann, 1988).  
Another benefit of investor ownership is the investors’ ability to bear risk. Firstly, the investors 
often have access to diversification at a reasonable cost. This enables them to reduce the firm-
specific risk, and therefore actually carry a lower total risk. Secondly, the investors are often 
wealthy, and thus less risk-averse on the margin (Hansmann, 1996). 
Despite the obvious advantages of investor ownership, there are also some disadvantages. One 
problem is the owners lacking ability to carry out effective control. When ownership is 
dispersed within a large group of patrons, as investors often are, owners face difficulties in 
coordinating themselves. This results in an inefficient control function, which leaves managers 
with substantial leeway to act opportunistically (Hansmann, 1988).  
A related challenge for shareholder owned firms is the collective decision making process. 
The large number of owners in investor-owned firms can increase the cost of organizing the 
decision-making process. However, if investors share similar interests, such as maximizing 
residual profits, the disadvantage of dispersed shareholding can be balanced. If this is the case, 
collective decision-making may not be more problematic to investor-owned firms than to 
others. Additionally, in shareholder owned MFIs ownership is often concentrated among few 
investors (Mersland, 2009). The concentration contributes to reduce the negative effect related 
to collective decision making and increase the investors’ ability to carry out effective control. 
3.2.2 Non-profit organizations 
While owners play a vital role as principals of for-profit organizations, there are no obvious 
principals in the non-profit organizations at first glance. The non-profit organizations are 
characterized by non-ownership. Steinberg (2003), proposes to consider the non-profit as 
controlled by a board of directors that must obey the non-distribution constraint, but still have 
a lot of freedom. Nevertheless, he argues that this constraint determines neither how the board 
representatives are chosen, nor how the conflicting interests of stakeholders are dealt with. 
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Ben-Ner and Gui (2003) argue that the main weakness of non-profit organizations is the 
limited monetary incentives for founding and operating such an organization. If a non-profit 
status is chosen, they argue that it has to have certain strengths to overcome this weakness. 
One such strength relates to provision of quality output. Non-profit organizations are expected 
to be more trustworthy in supplying output of promised quality. For-profits would have 
incentives to provide cheaper, lower quality output in order to increase profits. If no owner 
can appropriate such profits, the incentive to reduce quality diminishes. The controlling 
function of the board in non-profit organizations is also argued to be lower, because patrons 
without pecuniary incentives elect the boards in non-profits. Some boards are even self-
perpetuating (Hansmann, 1996).  
Bacchiega and Borzega (2003) propose to focus on distribution of the control rights within 
organizations. They believe that distribution of control rights can explain both the existence 
of and difference between non-profit organizations. They point out that the control structures 
of non-profit organizations are often unclear, particularly since control rights are separated 
from the residual income claims. They propose that non-profit organizations are driven by 
redistributing concerns or demand activities, and that these driving forces are flexible. 
By definition, non-profit organizations generally do not maximize profit. Instead, they 
promote the desire of their beneficiaries, driven by different degrees of altruistic and egoistic 
motives. Although some non-profit organizations are able to redistribute profits, e.g. 
cooperatives and mutuals, most non-profit organizations are restricted from doing so 
(Bacchiega & Borzega, 2003). 
The conventional argument states that the non-distribution constraint undermines the 
manager’s incentives for profit. Bielefeld and Galaskiewicz (2003) highlight both reduced 
incentives for customer exploitation and sub-optimization within the organization as possible 
challenges. They refer to social optimum maximization, to maximize a social objective, as an 
alternative to profit maximization for non-profit organizations. Nevertheless, empirical 
research points out the presence of some degree of profit maximization also in non-profit 
organizations (Bielefeld & Galaskiewicz, 2003). 
Financial rigidity is a challenge for non-profit organizations evolution. Brody (1996) pins out 
that non-profits must either reinvest or spend, due to their distribution constraint. As non-profit 
organizations are unable to distribute dividends, and thus cannot sell meaningful shares of 
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stock to secure financial capital, Steinberg (2003) argues that non-profit organizations in 
general are unable to choose the combination of debt and equity that minimizes the cost of 
capital. The inefficient debt ratio will in turn impede the growth rate of the non-profit sector. 
Although the problem of financial rigidity is an important characteristic of non-profit 
organizations, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
3.2.3 Cooperatives 
A cooperative is a legal entity owned and controlled by its members or customers. A true 
cooperative describes businesses where the owners are one of the groups of individuals who 
transact with the company. Employees, customers and producers are potential owners of 
cooperatives (Hansmann, 1996). This implies that cooperative members could have strong 
incentives to monitor the performance of the firm (Gorton & Schmid, 1999). 
Since they enable people to pool assets and resources, cooperatives can under the right 
circumstances, play an important role in poverty reduction. In communities that government 
agencies and non-governmental organizations have little contact with, cooperatives are formed 
in order to enable production of resources or land. This idea of self-help is especially prevalent 
in rural farming and agriculture (Birchall, 2004). 
Institutional restrictions imply that cooperative shares can only be traded within the 
cooperative itself and at face value. This means that cooperatives are protected against hostile 
takeovers, and hence the ownership structure cannot easily be changed. Another important 
restriction is that votes cannot be accumulated into blocks, since regardless of the amount of 
stock owned, each person only have one vote. This implies that monitoring by stock 
shareholders gets more difficult, since block shareholders cannot fully exert their voting power 
(Gorton & Schmid, 1999). In fact, Rasmusen (1988) argues that cooperatives have no 
stockholders because the managers are isolated from monitoring. 
 Theory of the Principal and Agent (Agency costs) 
The existence of agency costs was established in the introduction to ownership theory. 
However, since agency costs is an important prerequisite for the ownership theory, the 
following sections are designated at providing a more thorough presentation of the theory of 
agency costs.  
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The principal-agent model represents a situation of both conflicting interests and asymmetric 
information. In line with the literature, we will refer to the owner as the principal, and the 
manager as the agent (Hansmann, 1996; Hendrikse, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
According to Hansmann (1996), ownership is defined as a patron who has the formal right to 
control, as well as the right to residual income. The principal-agent problem arises when the 
owner deliberately gives up some of his control rights to an agent.  
The standard representation of the agency theory is a situation where a principal instructs an 
agent to perform some sort of action on his behalf. The principal designs a contract, which 
governs the relationship. The agent decides whether to accept the contract, and the level of 
effort committed to honor the contract. The level of effort applies to several aspects, and can 
be number of hours worked, the dedication of managers and the use of non-pecuniary benefits 
(Hendrikse, 2003). The principal-agent problem exist in various relationships and an 
individual or group can act simultaneously as both principal and agent in different relations. 
As an example, the executive board acts as an agent in relation to the owners of the firm, and 
at the same time as a principal in the relationship with the management (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997). 
The principal-agent model is characterized by a situation of available surplus, conflicts of 
interests and asymmetric information. When the principal’s willingness to pay exceed the 
agent’s cost of executing a task, there is an available surplus. This surplus can be distributed 
among the parties. The delegation of tasks and responsibilities between the principal and the 
agent is generally not without problems. The principal can observe the result, but not the actual 
effort provided by the agent and the circumstances that influence the agent. This implies that 
the principal faces a loss of control over the agent (Hendrikse, 2003). 
A typical situation in which the principal and the agent do not have aligned objectives, is when 
the manager pursues a bonus triggering goal, rather than pursuing the best interests of the firm 
and its stakeholders, such as maximizing profit (Hendrikse, 2003). Such behavior triggers 
agency costs. The agency costs occur since the managers do not have the possibility to observe 
the agent’s effort, or do not choose to do so since the cost of observing the agent is greater 
than the benefit of knowing the exact effort level. Accordingly, the agent has superior 
information regarding the provision of effort (Hendrikse, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 31 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describes three sources of agency costs. Firstly, the principal will 
incur monitoring costs in his attempt to get information about how the agent performs the task 
given by the principal, and limit his ability for actions. The cost of having a board of directors 
controlling the management, or internal audits are examples of monitoring costs. Secondly, 
the agent may incur bonding costs. Bonding cost is cost incurred by the agent in limiting his 
own opportunities, and hence reducing the chance of opportunistic behavior. The ultimate 
source for agency costs is the residual loss. This stems from the fact that it is prohibitively 
costly to instruct the agent perfectly of how to take actions that is in line with the interests of 
the principal. Accordingly, suboptimal decisions will be made. These decisions result in a 
residual loss. 
 Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance mechanisms are tools for reducing agency costs, stemming from the 
division between ownership and control (OECD, 2004). These are rules, practices, and 
processes by which the firm is directed and controlled. Governance mechanisms also includes 
outside factors that contribute to control the management, such as competition These 
mechanisms can be classified as ownership structures, board composition, financial policy and 
corporate environment (Berzins, Bøhren, & Rydland, 2008). 
Further, corporate governance involves the interaction and relationship between the owners, 
the board, company management and the other stakeholders of the firm. The stakeholders are 
groupings of people who have interest in the company's welfare, including its employees, its 
customers, its suppliers and creditors, governments and society (OECD, 2004).  
Balancing the interests of the partners, while ensuring that the firm has the necessary control 
mechanisms that enables it to develop, is an important aspect of corporate governance (Labie, 
2001). A firm’s governance system is particularly important when control rights are distributed 
to the management (Bøhren & Josefsen, 2007). The principal-agent problems argues that firms 
in competitive markets will underperform and disappear in the long run unless they have 
monitors who actively discipline managers in order to ensure economic performance (Bøhren 
& Josefsen, 2007). According to this logic, stockholders have an important role in monitoring 
management and ensuring that decision-making favors optimal utilization of the capital 
supplied.  
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 Hyphotheses 
The economic theories presented in the previous sections is quite general. The following 
section will draw on these theories, as well as the characteristics of the microfinance industry, 
when formulating the hypotheses that we test later in this thesis.  
3.5.1 Hypothesis number 1 
The theory of ownership and agency costs suggest that the shareholders’ right to residual 
claims gives them incentives to monitor the management, while in cooperatives such 
incentives are weak. NPOs are per definition ownerless due to the non-distribution constraint, 
and accordingly have no owners with pecuniary incentives to monitor management. This 
argumentation is related to the principal-agent relation between owners and management and 
do not exclude the possibility of NPOs implementing a performance pay system that equip 
managers with pecuniary incentives to monitor their subordinates. Since the shareholders in 
SHFs carry the cost of the management’s decisions through reduced residual payments, they 
will ensure minimization of unnecessary spending. In COOPs, the members carry this cost 
implicitly through higher prices, but the relation is less obvious, and the cost of collective 
decision-making is often high because the members have conflicting interests (Cuevas & 
Fischer, 2006). For NPOs, a board is executing the control function, but board members do 
not experience any monetary effect of slack control, and their incentive to control management 
is therefore limited. Based on this we suggest that operating cost levels are higher in NPOs 
and COOPs than in SHFs. 
Formally, we propose the following: 
H0: NPOs and COOPs do not have any effect on operating costs in MFIs 
HA: NPOs and COOPs have a positive
5 effect on operating costs in MFIs 
                                                 
5 A positive effect is here associated with higher level of operating costs. NPOs and COOPs are associated with higher 
levels of operating cost. This is of course negative for the MFI. This should not be confused with a deflated cost level, which 
would be positive for the MFI. 
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3.5.2 Hypothesis number 2 
According to Gonzalez (2007) and Hug (2014) personnel costs contribute the larger part of 
operating expenses. In order to delve deeper into the possible relation between ownership 
operating costs, we examine the cost of employees. 
When considering the ownership theory, the incentive structure provided by the residual 
claims once again stand out as an important feature of SHFs. Owners of SHFs have a pecuniary 
incentive to monitor the compensation scheme in an MFI because they are the residual 
claimants. Such incentives are weak and non-existent in COOPs and NPOs. Our proposition 
is that since shareholders have pecuniary incentives in avoiding over-compensation of 
employees, they will monitor their agents to prevent splurging on excessive wages. In other 
words, we expect NPOs and COOPs to display higher wage levels than SHFs. 
We provide the formal presentation of the hypothesis below: 
H0: NPOs and COOPs does not have an effect on personnel costs in MFIs 
HA: NPOs and COOPs have a positive
6 effect on personnel costs in MFIs 
3.5.3 Hypothesis number 3 
When considering personnel costs, one should also keep personnel productivity in mind. The 
last hypothesis therefore relates to personnel productivity. High personnel costs need not be 
negative in itself. If high personnel cost enable MFIs to attract employees that contribute a 
correspondingly high productivity or even superior productivity, the high cost approach may 
be justified, from an efficiency perspective. How to measure productivity is however far from 
trivial. We will return to this discussion in the section were we present our chosen variables. 
In formulating the hypothesis related to productivity, we rely on a relationship proposed by 
Adam Smith. He wrote, “Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the 
workmen more active, diligent and expeditious, than where they are low” (Smith, 1993, p. 86). 
The theory of efficiency wages (Yellen, 1984) corresponds with Smith’s assertion of a positive 
correlation between wage level and workforce productivity. The relationship advocate a higher 
                                                 
6 A positive effect is here associated with higher level of personnel costs. NPOs and COOPs are associated with higher 
levels of personnel cost. This is of course negative for the MFI. This should not be confused with a deflated cost level, which 
would be positive for the MFI. 
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personnel productivity in NPOs and COOPs than in SHFs, because SHFs are expected to 
display lower personnel costs. 
On the other hand, one could argue that since SHFs have a greater incentive to monitor their 
employees, they are likely to be better at detecting shirking and thus should be associated with 
a higher productivity level. This positive effect for SHFs is expected to be dominated by the 
previously described effect of wage level. 
In accordance with the previously proposed positive effect of NPOs and COOPs on personnel 
cost, and the expected productivity gains from higher wage levels, we suggest that NPOs and 
COOPs are associated with higher productivity. Due to the conflicting arguments stemming 
from the incentives to monitor, our prior on this question is less strong than what is the case 
for the previous hypotheses.  
We represent the hypothesis formally: 
H0: NPOs and COOPs do not have any effect on personnel productivity in MFIs 
HA: NPOs and COOPs have a positive effect on personnel productivity in MFIs 
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4. Research methodology 
In the following sections, we will describe our research methods and the data sample. We later 
describe the variables and econometric models applied to conduct the empirical analyses. 
 Research method 
Research methods in social science are often divided in two main categories, quantitative and 
qualitative methods. In accordance with the name, quantitative research relates to collection 
and analysis of numerical data (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 1996). Quantitative methods 
emphasize large-scale and representative data, and seek to reach a generalized conclusion on 
the subject or relationship in question. Results of quantitative research have a high degree of 
external validity due to the large sample sizes (Jacobsen, 2005). The basis for conducting 
quantitative analyses is a good basic understanding of the investigated subject, while the 
objective is to clarify the frequency or the extent of the effect. 
Qualitative research is a more explorative process. The researcher is more open and responsive 
to his subject. In this method, the researcher investigates all kinds of data, also non-numeric 
(Blaxter et al., 1996). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) describe qualitative research 
as: 
“An attempt to understand behavior and institutions by getting to know the persons 
involved and their values, rituals, beliefs, and emotions. Applying such a perspective, 
researchers would, for example, study poverty by immersing themselves in the life of 
the poor rather than collecting data with a structured interview schedule.”(p. 257) 
Our review of ownership and agency theory provides a theoretical basis for suggesting that 
ownership type affects different cost aspects in MFIs. We will use a quantitative approach in 
order to investigate this relation further. 
Little research has been conducted using large international datasets on the relation between 
ownership structure and costs. A quantitative study could give an overview of the typical 
relationship. 
A drawback of a quantitative study is that there is no information on contextual factors to help 
interpret the results or to explain variations in behaviour. More specifically for our study, the 
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quantitative approach does not allow us to capture the MFIs’ motivation for choosing one legal 
organization form over another. The study therefore needs both more quantitative studies as 
well as qualitative studies to scrutinize its findings. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the existence of applicable theory and our access to relevant data 
makes a quantitative analysis a good starting point for examining the relationship between 
ownership and costs in microfinance institutions. 
 Data collection & sample 
For our study, we use secondary data from a dataset compiled by a team led by Professor Roy 
Mersland at the University of Agder. The dataset contains information on 403 MFIs from 74 
countries. The dataset is compiled from individual rating reports for each MFI. These rating 
reports are publicly available, but the full dataset is not. The dataset has been the basis for 
several academic research articles as well as other graduate theses (D’Espallier, Guérin, & 
Mersland, 2011; Lislevand, 2012; Meberg & Krpo, 2009; Mersland & Strøm, 2008). The 
extensive use of the dataset support its credibility.   
Data validity is further enhanced by the fact that the source is five different third-party rating 
agencies. MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril are all approved by 
CGAP7. Trained and experienced personnel conducted the transformation from individual 
rating reports to a cohesive dataset. To safeguard the reliability the data entry was controlled 
by at least two individuals.  
The data has a certain selection bias. Since the dataset is compiled from rating reports, only 
MFIs that are willing to expose their accounts for scrutiny and rating are represented. Hence, 
the selection is skewed towards the larger and better performing MFIs. The selection hinders 
us from examining differences between rated and unrated MFIs, and from interpreting the 
effect of ownership types on costs for unrated MFIs. The selection bias may also have some 
positive consequences by filtering out noise, such as very small MFIs and development 
programs that do not intend to operate in a business-like manner.  
                                                 
7The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor is a global partnership of 34 leading organizations that seek to advance financial 
inclusion. The World Bank and UNDP are among the members. See www.cgap.org 
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A rating report contains information on several years for each MFI. Some variables are 
however only quoted for the year of the report. This hampers the ability to use panel data 
methods, because many MFIs are left with a single observation of the variable in question. 
Such variables, which are included in the model, are held constant over the period of the other 
observations, because they are assumed to not change often. This is in line with practice in 
several research papers (D’Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). 
The variables that are held constant are control variables related to governance mechanisms.  
The following figures illustrate the distribution of observations over ownership types and 
geographical regions. 
Figure 2 - Observations per Ownership Type 
 
Note: NPO refer to non-profit organizations, SHF denote shareholder-owned firms and 
COOP represent cooperatives.  
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Note: MENA refers to the Middle East and Northern Africa region, while EECA represents 
the Eastern Europe and Central Asia category. 
 Econometric Models 
We use multiple regression analyses to identify the effect of ownership structures on MFI 
costs. Even if the causal effect of ownership type on costs is what we really want to study, we 
must be aware that causality can also run in the opposite direction, or the apparent relation 
may be completely spurious. We will return to criticism of our methods later. 
Studenmund (2006) provides a description of the regression analysis: 
“Econometricians use regression analysis to make quantitative estimates of economic 
relationships that previously have been completely theoretical in nature. Regression is 
a statistical technique that attempts to “explain” movements in one variable, the 
dependent variable, as a function of movements in a set of other variables, called the 
independent (or explanatory) variables, through the quantification of a single 
equation.” (p. 6) 
186
363
58
627
271
Asia Africa MENA Latin America EECA
Figure 3 - Observations per Geographical Region 
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The dataset is on panel-form. Panel data contains multiple observations of each cross-sectional 
unit (MFI), from different points in time (Baltagi, 2013). The panel is unbalanced, which 
implies that we do not have observations of all MFIs at each point in time (year).  
Consider a true panel data model that is given by: 
(I)  yit = α + βxit + γzi + uit 
y denotes the dependent variable of the model. α is a constant term, often referred to as the 
intercept, and uit is an idiosyncratic error term. xit is variables that vary between cross-sectional 
units and over time. zi represents characteristics that varies between MFIs but are constant 
over time. These are often hard to observe and correspondingly often referred to as unobserved 
effects. These unobserved effects could stem for instance from abilities or culture, and can 
exist if the cross-sectional unit is persons, firm, countries or some other unit. We neglect 
unobserved time effects, since we circumvent these by including T-1 dummy variables for 
years. These dummies are not reported in the regression results. Since the z-values does not 
have a time aspect, we interpret the model as having individual intercepts for each MFI. The 
model can be written as: 
(II)  yit = αi + βxit + uit 
αi now represents all time invariant heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2014). 
4.3.1 Pooled OLS 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regress the data to identify the equation that minimize the 
squared residuals (Wooldridge, 2014). 
Pooled OLS simply means that we use the OLS technique on a pool of cross-sections. By 
using this technique, we disregard the fact that we have observations on the same cross-
sectional unit over time. We estimate (II) directly, and hence take advantage of all the variation 
in our samples, both between and within.  
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The models need to satisfy a number of assumptions for pooled OLS to produce consistent 
estimators. Wooldridge (2014) presents the assumptions: 
POLS1: xt is contemporaneously exogenous. It means that for a given year explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the error term. (As opposed to strict exogeneity, which 
implies that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables for all 
periods.) 
POLS2: Absence of multicollinearity. No perfect linear relationship exists among the 
explanatory variables. 
POLS3a: Homoscedasticity. Conditional variance does not depend on explanatory 
variables. Unconditional variance is the same in all periods. 
POLS3b: No autocorrelation. This prohibits a unit specific error component. 
The first two assumptions are sufficient to assure consistent estimates. POLS3 must also be 
satisfied for usual test statistics to be valid. 
4.3.2 Panel Data Models 
When examining panel data, there are several other techniques available. First Differencing 
(FD), Fixed Effects (FE), and Random Effects (RE) are all methods that use transformations 
to overcome the problems of unobserved individual specific effects (Wooldridge, 2014). 
However, our data set rules out the use of the two first mentioned. As we have already 
mentioned, some of our control variables are assumed constant, and additionally the 
explanatory variables related to ownership are almost perfectly time-invariant. The 
transformations used in the FE and FD models wipe out all time-invariant effects, and prohibits 
us from using these to analyse the data (Strøm, D’Espallier, Mersland, 2014). 
4.3.2.1 Random Effects 
The random effects model lean on a transformation that does not eliminate the unobserved 
effects, αi, from the model, but treat the unobserved effects as random effects. This 
interpretation makes the requirements for producing consistent estimates even stricter than the 
requirements of the pooled OLS model. The complicated transformation method involves 
subtracting a fraction of the time average for all variables in order to obtain the GLS estimator. 
Through this transformation, we arrive at a model that allow explanatory variables to be 
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constant over time. This is the main advantage of the RE model compared to the FE and FD 
model (Wooldridge, 2014). 
However, the RE model also have some requirements that have to be satisfied for the estimates 
to be consistent. The list of assumptions is quite comprehensive (Wooldridge, 2014). 
1. We have a linear model. 
2. We have a random sample of cross-sections. 
3. There is no multicollinearity. 
4. Both alphas and error terms are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and 
mutually uncorrelated. 
5. Alphas and error terms have constant variances. Homoscedasticity.  
6. There is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms. 
The assumption that distinguishes the RE model from other linear panel data models is number 
4. The RE model requires the unobserved effect to be uncorrelated with all explanatory 
variables. Like the FD and FE models, the RE model also requires strict exogeneity, compared 
to the contemporaneous exogeneity requirement of the pooled OLS model. 
Hausman (1978), developed a test to identify whether the conditions for using the RE model 
were satisfied. The null hypothesis states that there is no misspecification, in other words, the 
results of estimating the RE model are not significantly different from those of the FE model. 
When the null hypothesis is rejected, the RE model is rejected because it produces inconsistent 
estimates.  
We will later return to the assumptions for both the pooled OLS and random effects model, 
and evaluate whether the assumptions are satisfied in our analysis. 
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 Variables presentation 
In this section, we present the variables that are being used to identify and measure differences 
in cost structures in MFIs.  
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
4.4.1.1 Operating Expenditures to Portfolio 
This variable states the ratio of the operating expenses to the annual average loan portfolio. 
Both CGAP (2003) and MIX (2015) use the ratio. The OEP ranges between 0 and 1. 
Annualized figures are used if the report gives figures from within a year.   
The following formula is used: 
𝑂𝐸𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜
 
 
The OEP ratio can have several interesting implications, one being the strong relationship 
between cost reduction and gross loan to portfolio discovered by Gonzales (2007). His 
findings suggest that a 10 percent increase in gross loan portfolio to assets yields a 7 percent 
decrease in costs. Gonzalez (2007) also state that operational expenses constitute about 62 per 
cent of the rates MFIs charge their clients. 
The ratio is suitable for our analysis primarily because it includes operating expense, which is 
a good proxy for operating costs. Using a ratio instead of the dollar figure on operating 
expenses helps us relate the cost to some output measure. This allow us to study cost-efficiency 
rather than pure money expenses. The ratio also wipes out differences between MFIs that result 
from currency effects. 
Alternatively, one could use the ratio of operating expense to total assets. This is a better 
measure when other assets than the loan portfolio constitutes a large fraction of an MFIs total 
assets. Nevertheless, our sample displays adequately high and consistent portfolio-to-assets 
ratios to defend the applicability of the OEP ratio as dependent variable.    
4.4.1.2 Personnel Cost per Employee 
The cost per employee ratio states the personnel costs to the total number of employees. This 
ratio is used to calculate the MFIs average cost per employee. The variable is measured in US 
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dollars. This ratio helps us find a meaningful measure for the MFIs personnel unit cost. The 
following formula is used: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 =
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
 
The cost per employee is not previously used in academic research and represents a new 
contribution the discussion of the relation between ownership forms and costs in MFIs. 
The variable capture the compensation level in MFIs and is hence suitable for the analysis of 
our second hypothesis.  
4.4.1.3 Personnel Productivity 
Personnel productivity is a measure of the productivity of the human resources in the MFIs. 
The variable we use measures number of credit clients per employee. Formally, the variable 
is defined as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝐹𝐼
 
By measuring personnel productivity with regards to the total number of employees, we focus 
on overall personnel output. One could use a ratio of credit clients to credit officers. This 
would disregard inefficiencies of a large fraction of administrative personnel, and therefore 
we use total number of employees as the denominator in the ratio. The measure of credit clients 
to credit officers would also favour MFIs who report a small number of credit officers, without 
taking into account the number of administrative staff. Some MFIs may have highly 
specialized and productive credit officers, but to realize this high level of credit officer 
productivity, they may have to employ more administrative personnel. By focusing on overall 
personnel productivity, we do not have to worry about the distribution of employees.  
Another way to measure productivity could be to measure output per dollar spent on 
employees. One would require more output from a high-paid worker than a low-paid, arguing 
that this is the reason why the worker justifies a higher wage. A drawback with this measure 
is the fact that we have data for very different countries were purchasing power and hence 
perceived value of a given salary varies.  
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One could also imagine a different measure of output, in a productivity variable. An example 
could be gross portfolio per employee. This measure has the same problems with variety 
between countries as the previous, and additionally omits information on number of clients.  
Even though there are many possible productivity measures, they all seem to have challenges. 
Therefore we keep the personnel productivity ratio as our measure of employee productivity. 
Both CGAP (2003) and MIX (Miller, 2003) use the measure and hence confirm its relevance.  
4.4.2 Ownership Variables 
The explanatory variables we use to test our hypotheses are dummy variables on ownership 
forms. Our dataset consist of MFIs registered as five different types of legal organizations. We 
remove the category “Others” and the dataset then contain banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, NPOs, and cooperatives/ credit unions. In our regressions, we merge banks and 
non-bank financial institutions and denote them SHFs. This is consistent with previous 
research (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). The NPO variable is a dummy variable, which indicates 
if the MFI is a non-profit organization, or not. The COOP variable is a dummy variable, 
indicating whether the MFI is a cooperative. With SHFs serving as a reference category, we 
eliminate the risk of multicollinearity. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
The following variables are background variables, which we include in our analyses to control 
for differences among MFIs that are results of other dissimilarities than ownership form. The 
first five variables share in common that they are all governance mechanisms. 
4.4.3.1 Internal Audit 
Internal audits disciplines the organization and limits the opportunity for managerial 
opportunism. However, the cost of auditing will only benefit the organization if the audit cost 
does not surpass the gains. The variable is computed as a dummy, which is denoted 1 if the 
MFI has an internal auditor reporting directly to the board, and 0 otherwise. An internal board 
auditor that reports directly to the board, is expected to be value enhancing (Mersland & Strøm, 
2009). The relevance of having an internal auditor in MFIs is stressed in policy papers, and it 
is recommended that the internal auditor reports directly to the board (Steinwand, 2000). 
Having an internal auditor reporting to the board is a way of connecting the board governance 
with internal firm governance. Previous work shows no significant influence on MFI 
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performance, which is somewhat surprising given the importance given to this measurement 
in microfinance policy (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). Nevertheless, as earlier research focused 
on MFI performance, there is a call to investigate if having an internal board auditor effects 
the cost in the MFIs. 
4.4.3.2 Performance Pay 
Paying the employees based on their financial performance is a common way of compensating 
employees in firms (Lazear, 2000). The basic premise for performance pay systems is that 
once the employee’s incentives are aligned to those of the owners through a well-designed 
payment system, it will lead to a significant contribution to an organization’s effectiveness 
(Lawler, 1990). Although the efficiency gains of introducing a performance pay scheme is 
well documented (Lazear, 2000), the costs of implementing, monitoring and quality decline 
are costs that will hamper the effectiveness gain from a well-designed performance pay 
scheme.  
Overall, we expect MFIs with performance pay systems to have lower costs than MFIs without 
such systems. When it comes to cost per employee, we expect an ambiguous effect, as 
introducing a performance pay system normally will imply reducing the fixed salary. The 
effect of the bonus system is expected to be positive, but whether or not it will fully 
compensate the reduction in fixed salary is unknown. We expect a positive effect on personnel 
productivity.  
The variable for performance pay is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if any 
performance pay system is implemented, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we are not able 
comment on details of the systems. For example, whether different strength of incentives affect 
costs differently we therefore have to leave to future research to investigate. 
4.4.3.3 Competition 
Competition is a central aspect in disciplining the organizations. For example, new entrants in 
a market are expected to drive down cost and increase efficiency in order to survive in the 
market and stay competitive (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009). Market competition is also a 
substitute for other governance mechanisms, and can thus be an effective tool to discipline the 
management and the organization as a whole. Bøhren & Josefsen (2007), find that market 
competition is an important governance mechanism for Norwegian saving banks. Further, 
Mersland & Strøm (2009), find a significant increase in performance with an increase in 
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competition, since new entrants force MFIs to drive down cost and increase efficiency. 
Performance is in their study defined as the portfolio yield. However, some research suggest 
the opposite, that increased competition leads to higher costs and lower efficiency. Gorton and 
Winton (2003) argues that increased competition undermines the long-term customer 
relationship, and forces firms to engage in costly non-profitable activities in order to keep the 
customers. Ferro-Luzzi and Weber (2008), who show that the number of competitors has a 
strong negative influence on financial performance support this.  
Based on the preceding discussion we expect the market competition to have an effect on the 
MFIs costs. Although we are uncertain about the magnitude, we expect increased competition 
to result in a reduction in cost, since the incentives to lower cost, in order to stay competitive, 
is considered to dominate the contrasting effects.  
The variable used to measure market competition is constructed by experienced microfinance 
professional’s subjective assessment of all information provided in the rating reports. The 
raters have multi-country experience and have rated numerous MFIs, and should thus be able 
to provide judged information. Nevertheless, this variable should be interpreted with caution.  
The market competition variable is discrete, and has a seven-point scale ranging from 1 to 7, 
with 1 indication low or no competition, and 7 indicating high competition. 
4.4.3.4 Regulation  
Regulation will discipline the organization and limit the opportunity for managerial 
opportunism; however, there might be substantial costs involved in complying with the 
regulations. Furthermore, regulation can be a substitute for ownership (Bøhren & Josefsen, 
2007). Regulation may differ according to country specific differences. This is particulary 
important for our data, as the MFIs are located in regions of the world with poor regulation 
and governmental institutions. Therefore, there might be large discrepancies in how the MFIs 
are regulated. Accordingly, the findings in our study should be interpreted with caution. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the disciplining effect will dominate the added compliance costs, 
and hence suggest that regulated MFIs have lower costs. 
Regulation is also measured by a dummy variable. The variable takes the value 1 if the MFI 
is regulated by banking authorities, and 0 if the MFI is unregulated. In interpreting the results, 
we have to keep in mind that even though it is simple to determine whether an MFI is 
regulated, regulation practices may differ significantly between countries.  
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4.4.3.5 Savings to Assets Ratio  
The savings-to-assets ratio (SA) is computed as follows: 
𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Savings to assets is a measure of how large proportion of the assets that are financed by 
voluntary savings from the clients. Since deposits can be withdrawn at short notice, a large 
savings to assets ratio is expected to discipline management (Mersland, 2009). Based on this, 
we believe that MFIs with a high savings to assets ratio have lower operating expenditure 
ratio.     
4.4.3.6 Main Loan Methodologies 
We include two dummy variables for main loan methodology that both indicate whether or 
not the MFIs primarily offer group loans. Group lending is divided into Solidarity Groups 
(SG) and Village Banking (VB). In village banking the groups are quite large, typically 15-50 
members. The solidarity groups are smaller, and often count around five members. The joint 
liability of members is becoming less common in the solidarity group method (Ledgerwood 
et al., 2013). The village bank dummy variable indicates whether the MFI primarily utilize a 
village banking methodology. The solidarity group dummy variable indicates whether the MFI 
primarily offers solidarity group loans. Individual loans are the most widespread methodology 
and serves as a reference category. Both dummy variables are expected to have a positive 
effect on both operating expenses, and personnel productivity. 
4.4.3.7 Size 
Total assets can be a measure of MFI size. The average cost of operations changes as the size 
of a financial institution changes, implying that efficiency increases due to economies of scales 
(Humphrey, 1987). We expect that size has a negative effect on the operating expense ratio.  
The size variable is compiled as the natural logarithm of total assets. We do this transformation 
to avoid extreme impacts related to the great inequality in size among MFIs in our dataset. 
4.4.3.8 Age 
Kneiding and Mas (2009) suggest three reasons why older MFIs are more efficient than 
younger MFIs; higher numbers of loans may drive scale economies, higher average loan sizes 
may improve the cost structure, and more knowledge about customers may streamline 
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processes. Gonzalez (2007) shows that MFI efficiency is strongly related to age and that 
efficiency increases substantially over the years. Still, he finds that growing beyond 2000 
customers has no significant efficiency gain that can point in the direction of scale economies. 
This can be explained by the learning curve. When the customer base is build up, and most 
internal processes have been tested and improved the trend begins to level off. The positive 
effect of age may also be partly attributable to the survival bias (Brown, Goetzmann, & Ross, 
1995). This bias comprehends that poor performing MFIs are likely to go bankrupt before they 
reach a high age. This implies a reverse causal relationship, stating that high performance 
explains high age. Contradicting the expected positive effect of age on MFI cost, Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) finds that ageing MFIs increase default rates. Meberg and Krpo (2009) 
suggest that this may be attributed to the fact that they grant credit to new customers who may 
not be as creditworthy as the present customer-base. Despite the question of causal direction 
and the contradicting partial effect, we expect the overall effect of age on both operating 
expenses and personnel productivity to be positive. 
4.4.3.9 Regional Variables 
Indicator variables for geographical regions are included to control for regional differences. 
The regions are Asia, Africa (AFR), Latin America (LA), Middle East and Northern Africa 
(MENA) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA). The EECA variable is omitted from 
regressions to avoid issues of multicollinearity.  
4.4.3.10 Loan Outstanding Average 
Loan outstanding average is measured in the following way:  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
We expect larger average loans to be associated with lower personnel productivity, because a 
large loan require more managing capacity than a small one. Still, larger loans are expected to 
have negative effects on operating expense ratio, as larger loans are not expected to demand 
proportionately more work compared to a smaller loan.  
4.4.3.11 Economic Freedom & Human Development Indices 
Ideally, we would use wage statistics for each country to control for differences between 
countries. This is especially relevant in the personnel cost model were we operate with dollar 
figures. In the absence of wage statistics for all countries, The Heritage Foundation’s 
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Economic Freedom Index and the Human Development Index developed by the United 
Nations Development Program serves as proxies, and helps us adjust for country specific 
differences because they are expected to be correlated with the wage level.  
 Model presentation 
We will estimate three models for three different dependent variables. First, we examine the 
relation between ownership and cost by choosing an operating expense ratio as our dependent 
variable. The ratio records operating expenses relative to total loan portfolio. Secondly, we 
will delve deeper into the relationship between employee cost and ownership, as we use cost 
per employee as our explained variable. The third dependent variable is personnel productivity 
measured as number of credit clients per employee. This last model reflects productivity 
differences, which are not part of the second model. For each dependent variable, we first 
estimate a simple model using only dummy variables related to ownership type. The second 
step is to control for various governance mechanisms, and ultimately we control for a number 
of other factors, such as loan outstanding average, size and geographical location. 
(1) OEPit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + αi + uit 
(2) OEPit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + β5PerformancePayit 
+ β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + αi + uit  
(3) OEPit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + β5PerformancePayit 
+ β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + β8VBit + β9SGit + β10SIZEit + β11AGEit + β12ASIAit + 
β13AFRit + β14MENAit + β15LAit + β16LOAit + β17EFit + β18HDIit + αi + uit 
 
(4) CostEmployeeit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + αi + uit 
(5) CostEmployeeit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + 
β5PerformancePayit + β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + αi + uit 
(6) CostEmployeeit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + 
β5PerformancePayit + β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + β8VBit + β9SGit + β10SIZEit + β11AGEit 
+ β12ASIAit + β13AFRit + β14MENAit + β15LAit + β16LOAit + β17EFit + β18HDIit + αi + 
uit 
 
  
 50
(7) PersonnelProductivityit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + αi + uit 
(8) PersonnelProductivityit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + 
β5PerformancePayit + β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + αi + uit 
(9) PersonnelProductivityit = β1NPOit + β2COOPit + β3Competitionit + β4InternAuditit + 
β5PerformancePayit + β6Regulatedit + β7SAit + β8VBit + β9SGit + β10SIZEit + β11AGEit 
+ β12ASIAit + β13AFRit + β14MENAit + β15LAit + β16LOAit + β17EFit + β18HDIit + αi + 
uit 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. CostEmpl is the personnel cost per 
employee. PersProd is personnel productivity defined as number of credit clients per 
employee. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate 
whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. 
SG=Solidarity Groups. AFR=Africa. MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin 
America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human 
Development Index. For further information about the construction of the variables, we refer 
to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
 
 Data analysing tools 
The statistical software STATA, version 13, was our tool for analysing data. STATA is a well-
known and reliable statistical program for quantitative analyses.   
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5. Data analysis and findings 
In this chapter, we start out by evaluating whether the underlying assumptions of our models 
are satisfied, and move on to present descriptive characteristics of our variables. We present 
the results of the pooled OLS regressions and comment on these. At the end of the chapter, we 
present the results of the RE models and cross-sectional analysis as robustness checks for our 
pooled OLS results. 
 Evaluation of pooled OLS assumptions 
An important part of conducting regression analyses is to evaluate whether the assumptions 
the models rely on are satisfied (Studenmund, 2006).  
5.1.1 Contemporaneous Exogeneity (POLS1) 
We have not identified methods to test formally whether this assumption is satisfied or not. 
The following is therefore a discussion of the matter.  
Problems of endogeneity stems from three possible sources (Wooldridge, 2010). The sources 
are omission of relevant variables, measurement errors and simultaneity. We first turn to the 
problem with omitted relevant variables. The variation caused by the omitted variable would 
be accounted for partly by the included variable(s) and partly by the error term. These would 
then of course be correlated, breaking the assumption. The key concern when conducting 
quantitative analyses is the risk of omitting relevant variables. We have a quite comprehensive 
data set, but still it would be naïve to claim that all possible effects on an MFIs costs is 
represented by the included variables. By excluding some MFIs that contain obvious 
measurement errors, we have reduced the endogeneity problems related to measurement 
errors. Still, we cannot exclude the possibility of some degree of measurement error in the 
retained observations. We have a problem of simultaneity if the dependent variable of our 
analysis influence the explanatory variables. Between ownership forms and, for instance, 
operational costs, such relationships may exist. As we have previously stated, we try to 
examine the effect of ownership form on cost, but we cannot rule out the possibility that costs 
may influence choice of ownership form. Even though the ownership form is seldom changed, 
it does happen from time to time. Overall, the lack of exogeneity is a clear weakness of 
conducting a pooled OLS analysis on our data.  
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5.1.2 Multicollinearity (POLS2) 
Multicollinearity is a problem that occurs when an explanatory variable may be written as a 
perfect linear combination of other explanatory variables. For the ownership types, lending 
methodologies and the regional dummy variables we exclude one category from the models 
to prevent multicollinearity. After this precaution was taken, tests for multicollinearity did not 
detect high levels in the models, and the requirement of absence of multicollinearity is 
therefore considered as satisfied. The test results are reported in Appendix 1. 
5.1.3 Homoscedasticity (POLS3a) and Serial Correlation (POLS3b) 
We both ensure homoscedasticity and avoid serial correlation by clustering the error terms at 
MFI level. This means that we allow for correlation between observations of the same MFI, 
in some unknown way. By clustering error terms, we obtain larger residual, and thus tighten 
the requirements for the null hypotheses of our analyses to be rejected.  
 Additions for Random Effects 
We have already discussed why the fixed effects or the first differentiated model is not suitable 
for our analysis. The options are therefore to use pooled OLS or the random effects model. If 
the models have a unit specific error component, OLS estimation will produce biased 
estimators, due to omitted relevant variables. 
5.2.1 Testing for Random Effects versus OLS 
The Breusch-Pagan test allows testing of whether or not we have a unit specific error 
component (Breusch & Pagan, 1980). Since we are operating with an unbalanced panel we 
use Baltagi and Li’s extension of the test (Baltagi & Li, 1990). The null hypothesis for the test 
is that there is no unit specific error component. However, the null is resoundingly rejected for 
all models, implying that a unit specific differences that is not accounted for in the models 
exist.  
The Breusch-Pagan test suggests that we discard the pooled OLS model, and opt for a random 
effects analysis because there is an unobserved unit specific effect. The results of the Breusch-
Pagan tests are reported in Appendix 2. 
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The advantage of the random effects model is that it allow for time-invariant unit specific 
differences. However, there are disadvantages related to the random effects model to. No 
explanatory variables may be correlated with the unit specific error component. Additionally, 
where contemporaneous exogeneity was a necessity for pooled OLS to produce consistent 
estimates, the random effects model require strict exogeneity.  
5.2.2 Strict Exogeneity 
According to Bond (2002), strict exogeneity rules out any feedback from current or past shocks 
to current values of the variable. This is often not a natural restriction when models include 
several jointly determined variables The arguments against contemporaneously exogeneity of 
course also apply to strict exogeneity, and we conclude that the RE model also suffer from a 
lack of exogeneity among explanatory variables. 
5.2.3 Correlation between Explanatory Variables and the 
Unobserved Effect 
The Hausman test for misspecification is not satisfied for the models that include all control 
variables, with the exception of the CostEmployee model. Accordingly, for some of our 
specifications we discard all our possible tools for evaluating the models. In the models with 
less control variables, the Hausman test affirms our model specifications. The results of the 
Hausman test is reported in Appendix 3. 
The conclusion is that neither of the models are flawless. Endogeneity is a serious problem in 
both models. Despite the discouraging results of this chapter, the stronger requirement of 
exogeneity in the RE model convince us to elect the pooled OLS model for our analysis. We 
will not completely abandon the RE model, but will return to this as a robustness check on our 
results.  
 Descriptive Statistics 
Before we move on to the results of our empirical analyses, we will present some descriptive 
characteristics of our variables. Descriptive statistics helps to familiarize oneself with the data, 
and provides a starting point for examining differences between MFIs with different 
ownership type. 
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Examination of the data set reveals some unusual observations. This leads us to exclude seven 
MFIs from the analysis. The eliminated case numbers are 72, 75, 121, 276, 316, 318 and 362. 
One must show great care in excluding variables, as the regression should explain all data in 
the sample not just the well-behaved ones (Studenmund, 2006). However, when examining 
the MFIs in question, it seems obvious that some kinds of measurement errors exist. Previously 
we have also excluded MFIs characterized by the ownership type “Other”, and those MFIs 
with missing values on ownership type. The exclusion leaves us with 1522 observations 
distributed over 381 MFIs. 
Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics of our variables after the exclusion of the unwanted 
observations, and measures taken to keep one-time governance variables constant. 
Table 1 – Overall Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  
 
Observations  Mean Value Std. Dev. Min Value Max Value 
 OEP               1419  
             
0.323  
             
0.304  
             
0.015  
             
4.255  
 CostEmployee               1250       6 374.814       4 185.253  
             
4.194     26 363.950  
 PersProd               1403          126.793  
           
84.977  
             
2.000          720.000  
 SHF               1522  
             
0.345  
             
0.476  0 1 
 NPO               1522  
             
0.526  
             
0.500  0 1 
 COOP               1522  
             
0.129  
             
0.336  0 1 
 Competition              1461  
             
4.366  
             
1.519  
                     
1  
                     
7  
 InternAudit               1352  
             
0.431  
             
0.495  0 1 
 PerformancePay               1489  
             
0.583  
             
0.493  0 1 
 Regulated               1483  
             
0.282  
             
0.450  0 1 
 SA               1458  
             
0.114  
             
0.237  0 1.142 
 VB               1522  
             
0.185  
             
0.388  0 1 
 SG               1522  
             
0.244  
             
0.430  0 1 
 Individual               1522  
             
0.511  
             
0.500  0 1 
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 Size              1494  
           
14.797  
             
1.361  
             
9.867  
           
19.329  
 Age (Years)               1515  
             
9.342  
             
6.793  0 79 
 Asia               1522  
             
0.122  
             
0.328  0 1 
 Afr               1522  
             
0.239  
             
0.426  0 1 
 MENA               1522  
             
0.038  
             
0.192  0 1 
 LA              1522  
             
0.412  
             
0.492  0 1 
 EECA               1522  
             
0.178  
             
0.383  0 1 
 LOA               1410          743.380       1 233.852  
                   
0      24 589.000  
 EF               1478  
           
56.389  
             
6.039  
           
29.400  
           
78.000  
 HDI               1483  
             
0.565  
             
0.133  
             
0.239  
             
0.764  
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. CostEmployee is the variable 
measuring personnel cost per employee. The values of this variable is measured in USD. 
PersProd is personnel productivity measured by credit clients per employee.  NPO is an 
indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a 
cooperative. SHF refer to shareholder-owned MFIs. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village 
Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Indiviual=Lending to individuals. Afr=Africa. 
MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. EECA=Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average measured in USD. EF=Economic Freedom 
Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the construction of 
the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
 
We observe that the sample size is good for all variables. CostEmployee display the largest 
share of missing data, with approximately 18 % missing values. Before we comment the 
figures of Table 1, we will also present Table 2. After this, we comment the two tables jointly.  
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Table 2 represents the mean values when we sort observations into groups based on the three 
different ownership types. We run tests to check whether differences in means between groups 
are statistically significant. The null hypothesis of the t-tests is that the means are not different 
from each other. Formally, we test whether the mean of one group subtracted from the mean 
of the comparing group is significantly different from zero. 
 H0 : μ1 – μ2 = 0 
We use 5 % significance level to evaluate the hypotheses. The p-values of the test for equal 
means are also included in the table. 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics per Ownership Type 
 Mean Values P-Values 
Variable SHF NPO COOP 
SHF 
versus 
NPO 
SHF 
versus 
COOP 
NPO 
versus 
COOP 
OEP 0.358 0.335 0.181 0.2556 0.0000 0.0000 
CostEmployee 6181.244 6868.346 4723.475 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 
PersProd 128.150 133.960 90.959 0.2855 0.0000 0.0000 
SHF 1 0 0    
NPO 0 1 0    
COOP 0 0 1    
InternAudit 0.574 0.406 0.314 0.0023 0.0014 0.2283 
Performance 
Pay 0.638 0.652 0.288 0.7699 0.0000 0.0000 
Competition 4.361 4.676 3.600 0.0437 0.0012 0.0000 
Regulated 0.591 0.039 0.471 0.0000 0.0044 0.0000 
SA 0.140 0.016 0.436 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VB 0.124 0.250 0.081 0.0000 0.0797 0.0000 
SG 0.284 0.270 0.036 0.5824 0.0000 0.0000 
Individual 0.571 0.433 0.670 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 
Size 15.085 14.653 14.607 0.0000 0.0001 0.7000 
Age (Years) 8.207 9.212 12.868 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 
Asia 0.124 0.134 0.071 0.5963 0.0242 0.0045 
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Afr 0.354 0.133 0.360 0.0000 0.8786 0.0000 
MENA 0.023 0.058 0.000 0.0010 No COOP No COOP 
LA 0.290 0.509 0.345 0.0000 0.1483 0.0000 
EECA 0.196 0.155 0.223 0.0564 0.4202 0.0357 
LOA 825.975 576.581 1253.976 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 
EF 56.800 55.952 57.092 0.0134 0.5471 0.0134 
HDI 0.529 0.591 0.552 0.0000 0.0716 0.0009 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. CostEmployee is the variable measuring 
personnel cost per employee. The values of this variable is measured in USD. PersProd is 
personnel productivity measured by credit clients per employee.  NPO is an indicator variable 
for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SHF 
refer to shareholder-owned MFIs. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. 
SG=Solidarity Groups. Indiviual=Lending to individuals. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. EECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
LOA=Loan Outstanding Average measured in USD. EF=Economic Freedom Index. 
HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the construction of the 
variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
A p-value lower than 0.05 indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that states that there 
is no difference between the means of the two compared groups. 
 
The results of the tests give us a starting point for evaluating differences among the different 
ownership groups.  
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5.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Operating Expense to Total Loan Portfolio (OEP) 
The mean value of OEP is 0.323. It means that on average the MFIs use approximately one 
third of their outstanding portfolio on yearly operating expenses. Values ranging from 0.015 
to above 4, and a standard deviation of 0.3 indicates a large variation among the MFIs. Values 
above 1, which imply that operating expenses are larger than the overall portfolio, indicate 
highly inefficient MFIs. An explanation for such values may be that some MFIs are in their 
infancy and incur costs that are disproportionate to their outstanding loan portfolios. Most 
observations fall in the second lowest bin of the histogram. 
Figure 4 - Distribution of the OEP Ratio 
 
The difference among groups shows us that the mean value of COOPs are significantly lower 
than that of the other groups. Actually the average cost ratio of COOPs is barely exceeding 
half that of the other groups. The difference between NPOs and SHFs is not significant 
according to the t-test for difference in means.  
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Personnel Cost per Employee (CostEmployee) 
The mean value of 6374.81 suggests that, on average, one employee cost the MFIs slightly 
above 6,000 USD. Again, we observe large variation, with values ranging from 4 USD to 
26,364 USD. Some observations display large values, which result in a right-tailed 
distribution. 
Figure 5 - Distribution of Personnel Cost 
 
COOPs have the lowest average costs related to employees, and also SHFs have significantly 
lower costs than NPOs. One could argue that paying more for your employees makes 
economic sense if you receive greater productivity.  
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Personnel Productivity (PersProd) 
The mean value of personnel productivity is approximately 127. The interpretation of this 
number is that, on average over all MFIs, there is 127 credit clients per employee. This variable 
show significant variation with values ranging from 720 clients per employee to two clients 
per employee. The lowest values may be artificially low due to the effect of start-up years, 
when MFIs typically have few clients. Measurement error may be an alternative explanation 
for the low values. The highest concentration seem to be just around 100, but the right-hand 
tail pushes the mean higher. 
Figure 6 - Distribution of Personnel Productivity 
 
The variable is a productivity measure and closely related to the cost of employees. As 
mentioned previously in the section regarding personnel cost per employee, a firm can justify 
paying more for workers who deliver higher productivity. COOPs had the lowest costs related 
to employees, and also stand out here, this time in a negative fashion by displaying the lowest 
personnel productivity. NPOs displayed higher employee costs than SHFs, but cannot boast 
of a significantly higher productivity. 
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5.3.2 Ownership Variables 
Slightly above half the observations are of non-profit MFIs. The SHFs constitute about one 
third, while COOPs account for 13 % of the observations.  
Figure 7 - Distribution of Ownership Types 
 
Note: NPO refer to non-profit organizations, SHF denote shareholder-owned firms and 
COOP represent cooperatives.  
5.3.3 Control Variables 
Internal Audits 
The mean value of the internal audit variable is 0.431, which signify that 43 % of all MFIs in 
the study have internal auditors reporting to the board of directors. The SHFs stand out as the 
group with the highest level of internal audits, while NPOs apparent superiority over COOPs 
is not confirmed by the statistical test. The t-test referred in Table 2 indicate that there is no 
significant difference between NPOs and COOPs propensity to carry out internal audits.  
Performance Pay 
58.3 % of all MFIs implement a performance pay system. In the COOP category, the level is 
considerably lower than both the others. Less than one third of COOPs implement a 
52,6 %
34,5 %
12,9 %
NPO SHF COOP
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performance pay system, while the number is roughly two out of three for both NPOs and 
SHFs. There is no significant difference between the two latter categories. 
Market Competition 
The market competition variable is discrete and ranges from 1 to 7, where 7 is the most 
competitive environment. The average level of competition is 4.366, and there are a number 
of observations on all levels, except from the lowest level, which display only five 
observations. 
Figure 8 - Distribution of Competition 
 
Yet again, COOPs distinguish themselves from rest, and seem to be operating in markets that 
are less competitive than those of NPOs and SHFs are on average. 
Bank Regulation 
When we consider all MFIs jointly, 28.6 % are regulated. The variation between groups is 
conspicuous. Less than 5 % of NPOs are regulated, while almost 60 % of SHFs are. Among 
the COOPs, 47 % are regulated.  
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Savings-to-Assets Ratio 
The overall mean savings-to-assets ratio is 0.114. We observe that a vast majority of our 
observations display zero values.  
Figure 9 - Distribution of Savings-to-Asset Ratio 
 
When looking behind the graph, we find that the number of zero values is especially high for 
NPOs. We also note that the average savings-to-asset ratio of NPOs is 0.016. Savings 
constitute less than 2 % of total assets. This should not be surprising, keeping in mind the 
insight from the previous section. The fact that most NPOs are unregulated effectively 
prohibits them from mobilizing savings, which in turn result in deflated savings-to-asset ratios. 
Mean savings ratio for SHFs is 0.140. COOPs display mean ratio of 0.436. This number may 
be driven partly be a relative small fraction of zero observations among COOPs (7 % as 
compared to 92 % and 59 % of NPOs and SHFs respectively).  
We also note that adjusting for zero values produce consistent ranking of the groups mean 
ratios. This may imply that COOPs have a business model which is more reliant on mobilizing 
savings among clients in order to supply loans, compared to the other groups.  
Main Loan Methodologies (VB, SG & Individual) 
In all groups, individual lending account for the greatest share of observations, ranging from 
43 % to 67 %. Village Banking is the main methodology for one of four NPOs, while for SHFs 
and COOPs the number is about one out of ten. The difference between them is not significant. 
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Lending through solidarity groups is the main methodology for slightly above 28 % of SHFs. 
The number is similar for NPOs, while COOPs to a lesser extent use this methodology. 
Size 
The mean value of the size variable is 14.797. This is however difficult to interpret, because 
the size variable is the logarithmic transformation of total assets. We perform this 
transformation due to the immense variety of size. To illustrate this the minimum value of 
assets is 19 288 USD, while the maximum value is 248 115 376 USD. For single observations, 
we can reverse the transformation and arrive at the asset value, but we cannot do the same for 
the mean value. This is because the mean of the logarithms is not equal to the logarithm of the 
mean of total assets.  
Figure 10 - Distribution of Size 
 
Let us turn to the descriptive properties of the total assets. The mean value of total MFI assets 
is 6 433 831 USD. When comparing mean total assets we observe that SHFs are typically 
larger than NPOs and COOPs displaying mean assets of 9 033 188 USD. COOPs are also 
significantly larger than NPOs. 
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Age 
The average age of MFIs is slightly above 9 years. The oldest is however 79 years old at the 
last observation. Combined with the fact that no MFI can display negative age, a few old MFIs 
makes the distribution slightly right-tailed.  
Figure 11 - Distribution of Age 
 
On average, the COOPs are older than the NPOs, who in turn are older than the SHFs. This 
concurs with the evolution of microfinance described in section 2.2, as shareholder owned 
firms are the latest ownership form adapted in the microfinance industry. 
Geographical Regions 
The distribution over geographical regions are not of great interest, but we notice that there 
are no observations of COOPs in the Middle East and Northern Africa region (MENA). We 
also observe that the NPOs display significantly lower share of African MFIs, but a larger 
share of the Latin-American MFIs.  
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Loan Outstanding Average (LOA) 
The average loan size, considering all MFIs, is approximately 750 USD. The variation among 
individual MFIs are tremendous, illustrated by the histogram below. 
Figure 12 - Distribution of Loan Outstanding Average 
 
The average loan size ranges from almost zero to nearly 25,000 USD. When splitting into 
groups it seems apparent that COOPs typically provide the largest loans. Their mean loan size 
is 1,254 USD. This is peculiar given the fact that COOPs are also the group with the largest 
share of MFIs focusing on individual loans. The average loan size of SHFs is 826 USD, while 
that of NPOs is 577 USD. In studies focusing on outreach, a smaller loan size is typically 
associated with an objective of reaching a poorer clientele.  
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Economic Freedom and Human Development Index 
Figure 13 - Distribution of the Economic Freedom Index 
 
The Heritage Foundation computes the Economic Freedom Index, based on a thorough 
assessment of factors that demonstrate the rule of law, government involvement, regulatory 
efficiency and openness of markets. All countries receive an overall score ranging from 0 to 
100. The mean score of the sample is 56.4, while an average of all rated countries is 60.4. On 
average, the MFIs operate in countries with less than average economic freedom, but we also 
observe that there is a number of observations of MFIs operating in countries with a rather 
high level of economic freedom. NPOs have a slightly lower average level of the economic 
freedom index. 
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Figure 14 - Distribution of the Human Development Index 
 
The United Nations Development Programme computes the Human Development Index. The 
index range is 0 to 1. The mean of the sample is 0.565, compared to the 2015 world average  
of 0.702. This indicates that the MFIs operate in countries that are less developed than the 
average country. This graph also demonstrates a large variation among our observations. The 
average levels of the different ownership types are all in the range between 0.5 and 0.6, with 
NPOs displaying the highest mean level at 0.590. The interpretation is that NPOs on average 
operate in more developed countries, than other MFIs. This contradict the traditional notion 
that NPOs target the poorest clients and therefore operate in the least developed countries.  
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 Regression Results and Discussion 
The models are evaluated using the pooled OLS technique and the results of the models that 
utilize the operating expense to portfolio ratio as dependent variable is presented first. The 
result for the personnel cost and personnel productivity models follow subsequently.  
Table 3 - OEP Models Estimated with Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OEP OEP OEP 
    
NPO -0.0228 0.00172 -0.0198 
 (0.0346) (0.0445) (0.0393) 
COOP -0.177*** -0.179*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0312) (0.0393) 
Competition  -0.0133 -0.00738 
  (0.00915) (0.00797) 
InternalAudit  -0.0113 0.0570* 
  (0.0289) (0.0340) 
PerformancePay  0.0330 0.0679** 
  (0.0269) (0.0275) 
Regulation  -0.0207 0.00591 
  (0.0423) (0.0459) 
SA  0.0210 0.00538 
  (0.0677) (0.0679) 
VB   0.173*** 
   (0.0424) 
SG   0.0773 
   (0.0486) 
Size   -0.0559*** 
   (0.0108) 
Age   -0.00517** 
   (0.00221) 
Asia   0.0385 
   (0.0469) 
Afr   0.283*** 
   (0.0676) 
MENA   0.0616* 
   (0.0358) 
LA   0.0973** 
   (0.0381) 
LOA   -1.98e-05** 
   (8.14e-06) 
EF   0.00386** 
   (0.00150) 
HDI   0.575*** 
   (0.207) 
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Constant 0.358*** 0.384*** 0.494** 
 (0.0302) (0.0465) (0.214) 
    
Observations 1,419 1,168 1,087 
R-squared 0.034 0.055 0.269 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. NPO is an indicator variable for a 
non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. 
SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. 
MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding 
Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further 
information about the construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables 
Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels.  
 
NPOs appear to have an OEP ratio similar to the SHFs. This result is also consistent when we 
include control variables. The lack of significance may be discouraging at first, but the insight 
of the interpretation is interesting. The model suggests that there is no difference between 
NPOs and SHFs when considering their operating expenses relative to their portfolio. The 
insignificant coefficient is changing its sign back and forth between positive and negative, 
further highlighting the obscurity of the effect. This result challenges the established view 
among policy makers, that SHFs are more cost efficient than NPOs. 
The OEP ratio is significantly lower for COOPs. The COOPs maintain this characteristic even 
after we control for governance mechanisms and other factors like size and geography. The 
coefficient indicates that, when we do not control for any other factors than ownership type, 
the COOPs have an OEP that is 0.18 lower than SHFs. This corresponds with the descriptive 
analysis. Controlling for governance mechanisms does not change the coefficient, but in the 
full model, the coefficient is reduced to 0.11. This indicate that the two first models may suffer 
from omitted variable bias, while this bias is reduced when introducing more control variables.  
The result contradicts the hypothesis proposed by the agency theory, which suggested that 
COOPs should display higher OEP ratios than SHFs. Mersland (2009) provides a possible 
explanation for this result. In cooperatives, there is a diverging interest between net-borrowers 
and net-depositors. Initially, one would think that balancing the conflicting interest could be 
costly. Still, Falkenberg (1996) suggested that the conflict of interest actually serves as a 
governance mechanism that reduces the costs in the cooperatives. The net-borrowers put 
pressure on the organization to lower interest rates while net-depositors encourage the 
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management to increase the rates. This can result in a slim and effective organization, which 
is a necessity for thriving with a small net interest margin. 
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the inclusion of governance variables (model 2) adds 
virtually nothing to our analysis. No governance mechanisms appear to have a significant 
effect on the OEP ratio, coefficients of the ownership variables are unchanged, and the 
explanatory power of the model is still low. There may be two different explanations for why 
we observe this. First, there may be some sort of heterogeneity leading the coefficients to be 
biased. Specifically we call this a type 2 error. The model does not detect an effect that actually 
exists (Løvås, 1999). A second explanation may be that the positive effect of a certain 
governance mechanism, such as aligned incentives or increased control, does not surpass the 
added costs of implementing the system. The overall effect is therefore neutral. 
When we include additional control variables, we observe that many of them have a significant 
effect on the OEP ratio. Among the variables that display a positive relation with the ratio are 
the dummies for village banking method, African MFI, and the HDI. We interpret that an MFI 
deploying the village banking method, or operating in Africa, will incur higher operating 
expenses relative to their portfolio size than otherwise identical MFIs. MFIs operating in a 
more developed country will also be associated with a higher OEP ratio. 
Other variables have a significant negative relation to the OEP ratio. For example, the data 
supports a statement claiming that larger MFIs are associated with lower OEP ratios. The 
coefficient related to age and average loan size have a similar sign. Learning curve effects and 
economies of scale may explain the two first. For a given portfolio size, it also seems quite 
intuitive that the cost of servicing a few large clients must be lower than the cost of serving 
many small clients.  
We also notice that, when we introduce more control variables, some of the previously 
insignificant governance variables become significant. At respectively 5 % and 10 % 
significance level, performance pay systems and internal audits display a positive relation with 
the OEP ratio. This means that, all else equal, MFIs with some sort of performance pay system 
will have a ratio between operating expenses and portfolio that is 0.0679 higher. For internal 
audits, the effect is slightly lower at 0.057.  
It is easy to point to the fact that both systems involve costs for the organization. For example, 
implementation of a performance pay system would require management, which is not cost-
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free. On the other hand, the agency theory teaches us that agency costs should be reduced 
through the alignment of incentives. Our analysis indicates that the added costs of 
implementing a system for performance payment in MFIs exceeds the benefits of reduced 
agency costs. 
With this insight in mind, it also makes sense to look at the other governance mechanisms that 
display insignificant effects on the OEP ratio. The variable for the savings-to-asset ratio and 
the dummy for bank regulation both display coefficients that are not significantly different 
from zero. This may indicate that the costs related to mobilizing savings outweigh the 
reduction in agency costs stemming from the governance effect of savings. Similarly, the cost 
of complying with bank regulation may even out the positive governance effect of regulation.  
Table 4 - Personnel Cost Models Estimated with Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CostEmpl CostEmpl CostEmpl 
    
NPO 687.1 538.6 89.81 
 (466.4) (578.8) (580.7) 
COOP -1,458** -221.9 -899.1 
 (579.0) (752.3) (673.2) 
Competition  411.5*** 171.3 
  (148.7) (139.4) 
InternalAudit  860.9* -303.3 
  (444.0) (404.9) 
PerformancePay  1,500*** 400.4 
  (465.5) (384.5) 
Regulation  -633.0 -160.7 
  (618.1) (596.7) 
SA  307.5 -902.7 
  (1,033) (906.0) 
VB   -402.6 
   (528.5) 
SG   -114.3 
   (532.3) 
Size   1,177*** 
   (155.4) 
Age   -5.763 
   (21.18) 
Asia   -3,897*** 
   (997.4) 
Afr   -452.7 
   (1,325) 
MENA   -3,532*** 
   (1,063) 
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LA   -122.4 
   (691.7) 
LOA   0.173 
   (0.231) 
EF   -29.90 
   (27.63) 
HDI   8,181** 
   (3,552) 
Constant 6,181*** 3,359*** -14,187*** 
 (323.2) (876.5) (3,528) 
    
Observations 1,250 1,048 977 
R-squared 0.028 0.103 0.380 
Note: CostEmpl is the personnel cost per employee. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-
profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-
assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic 
Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the 
construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the models that estimate the effect of ownership type on 
personnel cost, measured by the overall personnel cost divided by total number of employees. 
The variable is a proxy for average wage level. 
NPOs display consistently positive coefficients, suggesting that there may be a positive 
relation between non-profit MFIs and a higher average compensation of employees. The 
coefficients are however also consistently insignificant, meaning that we cannot, with a 
reasonable certainty, conclude that a positive effect exists.  
The lack of significance suggest that there is no proven relation between the ownership type 
and cost per employee. This contradicts our hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
ownership type and employee costs. Other theories may contribute to shedding light over the 
lack of conformity between our hypothesis and the regression results.  
Besley and Ghatak’s (2004) theory of motivated agents highlights that agents may experience 
a motivational effect when they work in an organization whose goals are coinciding with their 
own. For example, one could argue that employees may identify themselves with the noble 
intentions of a non-profit and hence be more motivated, than their colleagues in the SHFs are. 
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This motivational effect may reduce the need for pecuniary incentives, which would imply a 
negative effect of non-profit MFIs on cost per employee. As we can see, the traditional agency 
theory and the theory on motivated agents propose different effects of non-profit ownership 
on employee cost. A possible interpretation may be that these effects level each other out, and 
thus result in insignificant coefficients of NPOs. 
COOPs stand out when it comes to personnel costs per employee as well. In the simplest 
model, we see that, on a 5 % significance level, the COOPs have a lower personnel cost per 
employee. The coefficient shows that the average cost per employee is actually 1 458 USD 
lower in COOPs than in SHFs. Once again, the effect of COOPs contradicts our hypothesis. 
The hypothesis proposed a positive correlation between cooperative MFIs and the cost of 
employees. As opposed to the OEP models, we observe that the inclusion of governance 
mechanism wipes out the effect of COOPs. This indicates that the negative effect in model 1 
may be a result of omitted variable bias. The effect first assigned to cooperatives may better 
be explained by differences in governance structures. 
Competition level and performance pay systems have effects on 1 % significance level, while 
internal audits also has an effect on 10 % level. All significant governance effects are positive, 
meaning that for example introducing a performance pay system is associated with higher 
overall personnel cost per employee. We explain this by referring to the internal audit variable. 
An MFI that implements such a system must employee auditors. Such personnel are often 
highly skilled and require a compensation above the average of the organization. Based on this 
logic, it does not seem surprising that MFIs with internal audit systems display higher costs 
per employee. The reason behind this could also be that high-cost MFIs hire more auditors 
because they need to improve. These arguments supports the observed effect, but reverse the 
causality of the argument. 
The positive coefficients for these governance mechanisms give important implications for 
practitioners. If governance mechanisms are implemented to improve the overall performance 
of the MFI, they must result in cost reductions in other areas, or increased income that exceeds 
the implementation costs, to be justifiable.   
When introducing even more control variables (model 3) the explanatory power of the model 
is significantly increased. The governance mechanism coefficients are no longer statistically 
significant, but some of the new control variables are. The ownership variables are still 
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insignificant. Size and HDI display positive coefficients, implying that respectively larger 
MFIs, and MFIs operating in more developed countries have higher personnel costs per 
employee. Originally, we included the HDI as a proxy for the dollarized wage level of different 
countries, stating that the unobserved wage level will likely have a positive correlation with 
the development level. The observed positive effect of HDI on employee corresponds well to 
this idea. The dummy variables for Asia and MENA regions show negative coefficients, 
suggesting that MFIs operating in these regions have significantly lower costs per employee 
than MFIs operating in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which serves as the reference 
category.  
Table 5 - Personnel Productivity Models Estimated with Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PersProd PersProd PersProd 
    
NPO 5.810 -3.749 -6.829 
 (10.02) (12.14) (10.56) 
COOP -37.19*** -26.76* 1.280 
 (11.42) (14.85) (14.33) 
Competition  -0.621 0.768 
  (3.149) (2.693) 
InternalAudit  2.383 -11.41 
  (8.452) (7.686) 
PerformancePay  -9.745 -7.972 
  (9.665) (7.877) 
Regulation  -8.719 -22.36** 
  (13.19) (9.938) 
SA  -42.78* -51.13*** 
  (22.50) (18.67) 
VB   67.08*** 
   (11.18) 
SG   50.88*** 
   (11.78) 
Size   19.75*** 
   (2.929) 
Age   1.509* 
   (0.791) 
Asia   39.50 
   (24.98) 
Afr   28.86 
   (20.22) 
MENA   -3.946 
   (16.81) 
LA   -3.919 
   (9.997) 
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LOA   -0.0155*** 
   (0.00321) 
EF   0.326 
   (0.487) 
HDI   5.798 
   (52.18) 
Constant 128.1*** 143.4*** -202.3*** 
 (8.582) (20.81) (60.28) 
    
Observations 1,403 1,154 1,084 
R-squared 0.025 0.038 0.375 
Note: PersProd is personnel productivity defined as number of credit clients per employee. 
NPO is an indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether 
an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity 
Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. 
LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human 
Development Index. For further information about the construction of the variables, we refer 
to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels. 
The models presented in Table 5 is complementary to the previous in taking productivity of 
the employees into account, by estimating the effect of ownership type on the number of 
clients per employee.  
In model (1) there is no significant difference between NPOs and SHFs. While this contradicts 
our original hypothesis, the hypothesis was largely founded on the proposed effect in the 
employee cost model. When NPOs are not associated with higher levels of employee cost, 
there is little reason to believe that they should be more effective. On the contrary, one could 
even imagine that the SHFs’ proposed advantage in carrying out control functions would make 
them better able to prevent shirking, and thus promote a higher level of productivity. The 
insignificant coefficients do however not support a proposition like this. After including 
different amounts of control variables, the sign of the coefficient changes. This indicates that 
when we control for other factors, NPOs are generally less efficient than SHFs, not more, as 
the first model suggests. However, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero, 
so we cannot conclude that a relationship exists.  
The COOPs stand out also in this last group of models. The COOPs appear to be less efficient 
than their peers are. In model (1) the coefficient tells us that on average an employee in a 
COOP serve 37 clients less than an employee in a SHF. The significance level is 1 %. 
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Including governance mechanisms as control variables changes the coefficient to roughly 
minus 27, but it is still significant on a 10 %-level. When we include additional control 
variables, the COOPs are no longer significantly different from the SHFs. A decreasing degree 
of omitted variable bias in models 1 and 2 may explain the diminishing significance of the 
COOP coefficient we observe when more control variables are included. 
When turning to the control variables we observe that the savings-to-assets ratio display a 
significantly negative effect in both models. The interpretation is that, if everything else is 
kept equal, a higher level of the savings-to-asset ratio will be associated with a lower number 
of credit clients per employee. An explanation for why we observe this relation may be that 
when an MFI start to collect savings, they will have to use employees to manage this part of 
their business. If they appoint extra personnel to perform these tasks, they increase the 
denominator of the ratio. If they, on the other hand relocate existing credit officers, they are 
likely to reduce the number of credit clients, hence reducing the numerator of the ratio. Either 
way, the ratio of credit clients to employees seems to diminish, when introducing a savings 
program. 
Furthermore, we observe that in the last model, regulation is also associated with a reduction 
in the personnel productivity ratio. The explanation is somehow coinciding with that of 
mobilizing savings. If an MFI is regulated by banking authorities, some personnel must be 
assigned to make sure the MFI complies with the regulating standards.  This can again be done 
through outside or inside recruitment, which both result in a diminishing personnel 
productivity ratio. 
We can also observe that the group lending methods are associated with higher employee 
efficiency, as is also elder and larger MFIs. To the contrary, MFIs with a high average loan 
size tend to display a lower ratio of credit clients to employees. When we control for size, the 
latter may be seen as trivial. If an MFI choose to increase the average loan size, they have to 
reduce the number of credit clients served, if the funds available is limited.  
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 Robustness checks 
In this chapter, we are running alternative regressions in order to test the robustness of the 
results from the pooled OLS analysis.  
5.5.1 Random Effects Analysis 
We return to the discussion from the research methodology chapter. We have analysed our 
data using the pooled OLS method, and now we re-introduce the random effects model. 
We perform a random effects analysis to verify the robustness of our results. As the three-by-
three structure of the models are identical to the pooled OLS, we only alter our analytical 
method. 
Table 6 - OEP Models Estimated with Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OEP OEP OEP 
    
NPO -0.0132 0.0196 -0.0151 
 (0.0310) (0.0372) (0.0351) 
COOP -0.160*** -0.168*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0287) (0.0345) 
Competition  -0.0159* -0.00575 
  (0.00812) (0.00733) 
InternAudit  -0.0155 0.0663** 
  (0.0255) (0.0325) 
PerformancePay  0.00871 0.0561** 
  (0.0231) (0.0246) 
Regulation  -0.00607 0.0236 
  (0.0333) (0.0414) 
SA  -0.00638 0.0187 
  (0.0536) (0.0434) 
VB   0.144*** 
   (0.0357) 
SG   0.0641 
   (0.0420) 
Size   -0.0833*** 
   (0.0143) 
Age   -0.00402** 
   (0.00189) 
Asia   0.0146 
   (0.0443) 
Afr   0.252*** 
   (0.0640) 
MENA   0.0726** 
   (0.0329) 
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LA   0.102*** 
   (0.0366) 
LOA   -1.37e-05 
   (8.98e-06) 
EF   0.00288** 
   (0.00128) 
HDI   0.497** 
   (0.202) 
Constant 0.346*** 0.395*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0406) (0.207) 
    
Observations 1,419 1,168 1,087 
Number of case 378 298 286 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. NPO is an indicator variable for a 
non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. 
SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. 
MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding 
Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further 
information about the construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables 
Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels.  
 
For the models which make use of the OEP ratio as dependent variable we observe more or 
less identical results as we did in the pooled OLS analysis. The main differences are that the 
coefficient for competition is significant on a 10 % level in the RE model (2), and insignificant 
in the OLS analysis. In model 3 the average loan size is not significant in the RE model. Apart 
from this, the same variables have significant coefficients, the signs of the coefficients are 
consistent, and the size of the coefficients are also fairly consistent with OLS. 
Table 7 - Personnel Cost Models Estimated with Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CostEmpl CostEmpl CostEmpl 
    
NPO 353.9 767.9 346.5 
 (416.1) (514.2) (504.1) 
COOP -1,759*** -376.6 -1,074* 
 (560.4) (622.1) (581.8) 
Competition  405.7*** 150.2 
  (124.5) (119.2) 
InternAudit  848.7** -258.0 
  (363.9) (368.7) 
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PerformancePay  1,228*** 83.43 
  (373.7) (310.7) 
Regulation  150.9 81.06 
  (508.1) (513.0) 
SA  340.0 -732.8 
  (655.9) (668.5) 
VB   -133.4 
   (411.9) 
SG   -110.8 
   (450.6) 
Size   1,235*** 
   (142.9) 
Age   23.72 
   (20.93) 
Asia   -4,149*** 
   (872.5) 
Afr   -831.6 
   (1,165) 
MENA   -3,843*** 
   (1,116) 
LA   -406.5 
   (565.5) 
LOA   0.0876 
   (0.101) 
EF   17.81 
   (21.88) 
HDI   7,795** 
   (3,209) 
Constant 6,079*** 3,007*** -17,483*** 
 (310.6) (708.1) (3,102) 
    
Observations 1,250 1,048 977 
Number of case 332 269 258 
Note: CostEmpl is the personnel cost per employee. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-
profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-
assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic 
Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the 
construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels. 
 
The RE analysis using personnel cost per employee as dependent variable also generates 
similar results as the pooled OLS model. The coefficient of the COOPs is now significant at a 
10 % level in model 3, but apart from that, all the same variables display significant 
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coefficients. We observe some variation in the size of the coefficients, but the sign of 
significant coefficients are consistent. 
Table 8 - Personnel Productivity Models Estimated with Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PersProd PersProd PersProd 
    
NPO -4.782 -10.12 -3.961 
 (10.35) (14.74) (14.06) 
COOP -42.22*** -37.06*** -23.38 
 (11.46) (14.02) (15.06) 
Competition  3.051 0.629 
  (2.714) (2.425) 
InternAudit  8.254 -3.372 
  (6.452) (7.584) 
PerformancePay  -1.142 -6.097 
  (8.145) (7.059) 
Regulation  -3.881 -22.80** 
  (12.24) (10.91) 
SA  -14.60 -17.11 
  (13.70) (13.96) 
VB   51.41*** 
   (17.69) 
SG   42.05*** 
   (13.13) 
Size   13.79*** 
   (3.849) 
Age   2.114* 
   (1.199) 
Asia   39.60 
   (28.44) 
Afr   30.84 
   (24.41) 
MENA   -13.67 
   (21.49) 
LA   -18.92 
   (21.90) 
LOA   -0.00858** 
   (0.00436) 
EF   0.694* 
   (0.415) 
HDI   3.948 
   (60.76) 
Constant 135.7*** 121.9*** -139.5** 
 (9.223) (18.52) (66.02) 
    
Observations 1,403 1,154 1,084 
Number of case 371 293 283 
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Note: PersProd is personnel productivity defined as number of credit clients per employee. 
NPO is an indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether 
an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity 
Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. 
LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human 
Development Index. For further information about the construction of the variables, we refer 
to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels. 
When we examine the personnel productivity models using RE, we find two differences in 
model 3. The coefficient for savings-to-assets ratio was significant at 1 % level when we used 
pooled OLS, but when we turn to RE the coefficient is no longer significantly different from 
zero. For the economic freedom variable, the effect is contrasting. An insignificant effect in 
the pooled OLS model is turned to a significantly positive relation when we use the RE 
method. The coefficient is significant at a 10 % level. 
The values of other coefficients differ between the two methods, but all significant coefficient 
have consistent signs. In general, the random effect models confirm the results obtained from 
the pooled OLS analyses. 
5.5.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis (OLS) 
In order to challenge the results from the pooled OLS analysis further, we also conduct an 
OLS analysis on a cross section of the MFIs. In a cross-sectional analysis we neglect the inner 
variation in the MFIs, in other words, the time variation in an individual MFI. 
Because the cross-section is compiled of observations of MFIs from different points in time, 
we must include a variable stating which year the observation is from. When we estimated our 
models, the year variable was consistently insignificant for all regressions. Based on the 
consistent insignificance we refrain from reporting the year variable in our tables. 
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Table 9 - OEP Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OEP OEP OEP 
    
NPO 0.0129 0.0362 0.00184 
 (0.0236) (0.0259) (0.0203) 
COOP -0.103*** -0.117*** -0.0726*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0252) (0.0232) 
Competition  -0.0249 0.0196 
  (0.0197) (0.0201) 
InternAudit  0.0132 0.0267 
  (0.0199) (0.0180) 
PerformancePay  -0.00592 -0.00105 
  (0.00593) (0.00547) 
Regulation  -0.0174 -0.0135 
  (0.0227) (0.0207) 
SA  0.0688 0.0544 
  (0.0528) (0.0422) 
VB   0.110*** 
   (0.0274) 
SG   0.0587** 
   (0.0237) 
Size   -0.0286*** 
   (0.00799) 
Age   -0.00266*** 
   (0.000956) 
Asia   0.000202 
   (0.0345) 
Afr   0.160*** 
   (0.0426) 
MENA   0.0133 
   (0.0296) 
LA   0.0752*** 
   (0.0208) 
LOA   -3.95e-05*** 
   (9.87e-06) 
EF   0.00356*** 
   (0.00130) 
HDI   0.412*** 
   (0.133) 
Constant 0.279*** 0.286*** 0.218 
 (0.0335) (0.0398) (0.164) 
    
Observations 375 289 275 
R-squared 0.042 0.093 0.413 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. NPO is an indicator variable for a 
non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. 
SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. 
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MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding 
Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further 
information about the construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables 
Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels.  
 
We notice that COOPs are still associated with significantly lower OEP ratios than SHFs in 
all models. The sizes of the coefficients are also somehow consistent. NPOs are also displaying 
consistent coefficient throughout the models, but the positive relation to OEP ratio is never 
significant.  
We observe some differences when we compare the results of the pooled OLS with OLS 
analysis of a cross-section of observations. Performance pay and internal audit, which both 
had a positive relation to the OEP ratio in the pooled OLS model do not have any significance 
in the cross-sectional analysis. Other dissimilarities between the pooled OLS analysis and the 
cross-sectional OLS analysis are a significant positive effect of solidarity group lending, and 
a lack of significant effect of the Middle East and Northern Africa dummy when the cross 
section is examined. The MENA had a positive effect in the pooled OLS model. The 
differences are all in model 3. Unmentioned significant coefficients display consistent signs. 
Table 10 - Personnel Cost Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CostEmpl CostEmpl CostEmpl 
    
NPO 663.3 960.3 701.4 
 (519.3) (718.2) (709.4) 
COOP -1,121 565.4 87.96 
 (686.4) (830.0) (898.1) 
Competition  1,059** -481.5 
  (537.3) (502.9) 
InternAudit  1,854*** 386.8 
  (615.1) (529.5) 
PerformancePay  437.0** 183.6 
  (180.1) (169.4) 
Regulation  -249.7 302.7 
  (731.8) (721.2) 
SA  319.6 -925.7 
  (1,123) (1,209) 
VB   -93.22 
   (577.9) 
 85 
SG   -166.4 
   (677.3) 
Size   1,382*** 
   (199.8) 
Age   -46.14 
   (29.38) 
Asia   -3,589*** 
   (1,157) 
Afr   842.4 
   (1,533) 
MENA   -3,723*** 
   (1,433) 
LA   188.9 
   (818.4) 
LOA   0.308 
   (0.363) 
EF   4.741 
   (35.95) 
HDI   11,873*** 
   (4,074) 
Constant 6,373*** 3,122** -22,171*** 
 (718.6) (1,259) (4,595) 
    
Observations 322 256 243 
R-squared 0.020 0.114 0.427 
Note: CostEmpl is the personnel cost per employee. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-
profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-
assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic 
Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the 
construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Which means that 
the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable on the target variable, is 
rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See Appendix 4 for a general 
discussion of significance levels. 
The cross-sectional analysis of costs per employee shows no significant effects of any 
ownership forms. The pooled OLS analyses were also weak on significant effects, but 
displayed a negative effect of COOPs in model 1. The effect of COOPs switches from negative 
to positive when control variables are introduced, but the coefficient remains insignificant. 
The NPOs display consistently positive, but also insignificant effects throughout the models. 
In model 2 and 3, the same variables have significant coefficients as in the corresponding 
models analysed with pooled OLS. The variables also display consistent signs and sizes.  
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Table 11 - Personnel Productivity Models - Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PersProd PersProd PersProd 
    
NPO -2.012 -17.71 -23.32 
 (12.31) (15.90) (15.67) 
COOP -46.91*** -40.32** -2.750 
 (13.79) (17.53) (18.71) 
Competition  0.691 -20.84* 
  (11.16) (10.69) 
InternAudit  -14.34 -14.31 
  (13.29) (10.70) 
PerformancePay  -0.0423 0.375 
  (4.075) (3.427) 
Regulation  -4.009 -24.16* 
  (15.92) (13.52) 
SA  -55.74** -70.12*** 
  (27.57) (24.66) 
VB   73.45*** 
   (15.63) 
SG   48.61*** 
   (12.52) 
Size   24.24*** 
   (3.969) 
Age   2.647** 
   (1.286) 
Asia   10.00 
   (29.97) 
Afr   15.45 
   (25.43) 
MENA   -37.38 
   (24.27) 
LA   -18.49 
   (13.74) 
LOA   -0.0266*** 
   (0.00472) 
EF   -0.363 
   (0.733) 
HDI   -19.56 
   (67.18) 
Constant 145.5*** 182.4*** -172.8* 
 (18.39) (34.28) (98.79) 
    
Observations 368 284 272 
R-squared 0.028 0.052 0.426 
Note: PersProd is personnel productivity defined as number of credit clients per employee. 
NPO is an indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether 
an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity 
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Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. 
LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human 
Development Index. For further information about the construction of the variables, we refer 
to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 Which means that the null hypothesis, stating no effect of the explanatory variable 
on the target variable, is rejected at respectively 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance levels. See 
Appendix 1 for a general discussion of significance levels. 
At last, we turn to the personnel productivity model. When analysing the cross section using 
model 3, we find that internal audit has a negative effect on productivity. The effect is 
significant on 10 % level, and is distinguished from the results of the pooled OLS analysis. 
This is the only case where a variable display a significant effect in the cross-sectional analysis 
and not in the pooled OLS analysis. For all other significant coefficients from the pooled OLS, 
the signs are consistent, while the size of the effects vary.  
Overall, the results of the robustness checks are in line with the result of our pooled OLS 
analysis. The consistency of the results strengthens our confidence in the analyses. 
Nevertheless, all methods have their weaknesses. Endogeneity problems are prevalent and 
some of the RE models are also incorrectly specified according to the Hausman-test. These 
problems persuade us to use caution in reading causality into the results, in spite of the 
affirming results of the robustness checks.  
  
 88
 Summary of the models 
Table 12 - Summary of the Results 
Dependent variable Method Model NPO COOP 
  Hypothesis   + + 
Operating Expense to 
Portfolio (OEP) 
Pooled OLS 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 - 
Random Effects 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 - 
Cross-section OLS 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 - 
  Hypothesis   + + 
Personnel Cost per 
Employee (CostEmpl) 
Pooled OLS 
1 0 - 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
Random Effects 
1 0 - 
2 0 0 
3 0 - 
Cross-section OLS 
1 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
  Hypothesis   + + 
Personnel Productivity 
(PersProd) 
Pooled OLS 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 0 
Random Effects 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 0 
Cross-section OLS 
1 0 - 
2 0 - 
3 0 0 
Note: + signify a positive effect, meaning that the coefficient of the display, or is expected 
to display a positive sign. - signify a negative effect, meaning that the coefficient of the 
display, or is expected to display a negative sign. 0 indicate that the variable display an 
insignificant effect, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, when evaluated at 
1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level. See Appendix 1 for a general discussion of 
significance levels. 
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6. Conclusion 
Motivated by an increased consciousness of costs in the microfinance industry, and a call from 
policy makers for transformation of nonprofit MFIs, this study has investigated the relation 
between ownership types and costs in microfinance institutions.  
Economic theory propose that shareholder owned firms should be more cost-effective than 
nonprofits and cooperatives, mainly due to their advantageous incentive structure. However, 
our empirical analysis do not concur with the theoretical propositions. Regardless of model 
specification and method of analysis, the nonprofit variable displays insignificant effects on 
MFI costs. One plausible interpretation is that operating structures of nonprofits and SHFs are 
fairly similar. This suggestion does however not correspond well with the descriptive evidence 
provided in Table 2. For example, NPOs display a larger propensity for group lending, while 
SHFs generally provide larger loans. These two characteristics may even each other out, when 
it comes to total effect on MFI costs. Group lending is considered to be cost effective because 
some of the monitoring control function is outsourced to the inner justice of the groups. Larger 
loan size is also associated with lower costs, since fixed costs contribute a considerable 
fraction of the overall costs related to a loan. These effects are confirmed by our results from 
regression 3, displayed in Table 3, regression 3. 
An alternative explanation is that NPOs possess some undisclosed cost benefits that balance 
the drawbacks of their incentive structure. For example, the environment the MFI operates in 
may favor NPOs through beneficial tax treatment. This example illustrates the issue of 
endogeneity, as the advantageous tax system may have affected the organizations original 
choice of nonprofit status. In other words, the nonprofit organization form may affect the cost 
structure; but the cost structures may also affect the choice of organizational form. The 
possible two-way causality limits our ability to interpret our results as causal effects of 
ownership type on MFI costs. A favorable environment may be one potential source of cost 
benefits, NPOs may also have other cost advantages compared to SHFs. We encourage further 
research on the cost advantages of the nonprofit organization form. 
Our analysis also show that cooperatives display significantly lower operating expenses than 
shareholder owned firms do. This contradicts our hypothesis, but Falkenberg (1996) provides 
a plausible explanation, based on the conflict of interest between net-borrowers and net-
depositors in cooperatives. Net-borrowers have a desire for low interest rates, while the net-
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depositors would argue for higher interest rates because it benefits them. This cross pressure 
advocates slim margins between borrowing and deposit rates. Operating with a slim interest 
margin can only be sustainable if operational costs are low, and the conflict of interests can 
therefore serve as a governance mechanism in cooperatives. 
Different econometric models were utilized to evaluate the theoretical hypotheses. The 
random effects model and an OLS analysis of a cross section of MFIs confirmed the results of 
the pooled OLS model. However, results must be interpreted carefully as the assumptions for 
consistent estimates were violated for all of the models. Specifically, the lack of exogeneity is 
a recurring issue in all models. The Hausman test for misspecification also uncovers that some 
of the RE models were misspecified.  
To control for other factors than ownership type that is expected to affect costs in the MFIs, a 
number of control variables are included in our analyses. Overall, the models generate 
consistent results after the inclusion of control variables, but the negative effect of COOPs on 
personnel cost and personnel productivity is wiped away. This may indicate that the lower 
personnel cost and higher personnel productivity displayed by COOPs in the simplest models 
are better explained by the differences in the control variables. 
Despite problems of endogeneity, this study should encourage further research on the subject 
of ownership costs in microfinance. Specifically, we recommend other researchers to 
investigate the relation of ownership type and employee cost, for example through a more 
detailed assessment of the effect of incentive wages and performance pay in MFIs.  
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8. Appendices 
 Appendix 1. Results from Test for Multicollinearity 
We use the variance inflation factor (VIF) to examine whether we have issues of 
multicollinearity in our models. According O’Brien (2007) a VIF of 10 is commonly used as 
a threshold for a problematic level of multicollinearity. The following tables present no VIFs 
exceeding this threshold. 
Table A-1 - Multicollinearity Test in OEP Models 
Model Variable VIF 
(1) 
OEP 1.03 
NPO 1.20 
COOP 1.24 
(2) 
OEP 1.06 
NPO 1.84 
COOP 1.64 
InternalAudit 1.10 
PerformancePay 1.15 
Competition 1.12 
Regulated 1.63 
SA 1.63 
(3) 
OEP 1.37 
NPO 2.03 
COOP 1.99 
InternalAudit 1.28 
PerformancePay 1.26 
Competition 1.18 
Regulated 1.76 
SA 1.91 
VB 1.37 
SG 1.31 
Size 1.54 
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Age 1.36 
Asia 1.86 
Afr 5.04 
MENA 1.35 
LA 2.49 
LOA 1.29 
EF 1.12 
HDI 3.75 
Note: OEP is the operating expense to portfolio ratio. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-
profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-
assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic 
Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the 
construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation.  
Table A-2 - Multicollinearity in Personnel Cost Models 
Model Variable VIF 
(1) 
CostEmployee 1.03 
NPO 1.21 
COOP 1.22 
(2) 
CostEmployee 1.11 
NPO 1.86 
COOP 1.64 
InternalAudit 1.09 
PerformancePay 1.18 
Competition 1.13 
Regulated 1.63 
SA 1.67 
(3) 
CostEmployee 1.61 
NPO 2.09 
COOP 2.06 
InternalAudit 1.25 
PerformancePay 1.30 
Competition 1.22 
Regulated 1.77 
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SA 1.96 
VB 1.29 
SG 1.23 
Size 1.58 
Age 1.36 
Asia 1.81 
Afr 3.93 
MENA 1.36 
LA 2.31 
LOA 1.26 
EF 1.13 
HDI 3.27 
Note: CostEmpl is the personnel cost per employee. NPO is an indicator variable for a non-
profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-
assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East 
and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic 
Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development Index. For further information about the 
construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 Variables Presentation 
Table A-3 - Multicollinearity in Personnel Productivity Models 
Model Variable VIF 
(1) 
PersProd 1.03 
NPO 1.19 
COOP 1.21 
(2) 
PersProd 1.04 
NPO 1.82 
COOP 1.61 
InternalAudit 1.09 
PerformancePay 1.14 
Competition 1.11 
Regulated 1.65 
SA 1.64 
(3) PersProd 1.60 
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NPO 2.02 
COOP 1.99 
InternalAudit 1.26 
PerformancePay 1.25 
Competition 1.18 
Regulated 1.80 
SA 1.96 
VB 1.47 
SG 1.39 
Size 1.53 
Age 1.37 
Asia 1.84 
Afr 4.76 
MENA 1.34 
LA 2.37 
LOA 1.37 
EF 1.10 
HDI 3.63 
Note: PersProd is personnel productivity defined as number of credit clients per employee. 
NPO is an indicator variable for a non-profit organization, while COOP indicate whether an 
MFI is a cooperative. SA=Savings-to-assets ratio. VB=Village Banking. SG=Solidarity 
Groups. Afr=Africa. MENA=Middle East and Northern Africa. LA=Latin America. 
LOA=Loan Outstanding Average. EF=Economic Freedom Index. HDI=Human Development 
Index. For further information about the construction of the variables, we refer to chapter 4.4 
Variables Presentation.  
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 Appendix 2. Results from Breusch-Pagan Test 
The Breusch-Pagan test indicates whether a unit specific error component exist in the model, 
and thus whether pooled OLS is valid. If not we should opt for a random effects model 
(Breusch & Pagan, 1980). The null hypothesis stating that OLS is valid is rejected for all 
models. 
Table A-4 - Results from Breusch-Pagan Test 
 Chi2 P-value 
OEP(1) 900.10 0.0000 
OEP(2) 788.38 0.0000 
OEP(3) 560.02 0.0000 
CostEmployee(1) 1269.22 0.0000 
CostEmployee(2) 995.70 0.0000 
CostEmployee(3) 814.81 0.0000 
PersProd(1) 1267.60 0.0000 
PersProd(2) 989.87 0.0000 
PersProd(3) 758.04 0.0000 
Note: OEP refers to the Operating Expense to Portfolio Ratio. CostEmployee is defined as 
personnel cost per employee. PersProd is Personnel Productivity and refers to the ratio of 
credit clients over total employees. 
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 Appendix 3. Results of the Random Effects Analyses 
This appendix presents the chi-squared values and p-values from the Hausman-test for all RE-
models. The null hypothesis states that the RE model is correctly specified and hence 
producing consistent estimates. The alternative hypothesis states that the RE model is 
producing inconsistent estimates because it is misspecified. A 5 % significance level is used 
in evaluation of the hypotheses. Models were the null hypothesis is rejected are marked in 
bold. The appendix also include a table displaying the explanatory power (R2) of the random 
effects models. 
Table A-5 - Results of the Hausman Test 
 Chi2 P-value 
OEP(1) 1.73 0.4201 
OEP(2) 4.63 0.5918 
OEP(3) 41.72 0.0001 
CostEmployee(1) 0.41 0.5241 
CostEmployee(2) 6.74 0.3459 
CostEmployee(3) 21.11 0.0707 
PersProd(1) 1.45 0.4842 
PersProd(2) 9.07 0.1698 
PersProd(3) 48.84 0.0000 
Note: OEP refers to the Operating Expense to Portfolio Ratio. CostEmployee is defined as 
personnel cost per employee. PersProd is Personnel Productivity and refers to the ratio of 
credit clients over total employees. 
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Table A-6 - Explanatory Power of the Random Effect Models 
 R2 
OEP(1) 0.0335 
OEP(2) 0.0519 
OEP(3) 0.2562 
CostEmployee(1) 0.0263 
CostEmployee(2) 0.0957 
CostEmployee(3) 0.3705 
PersProd(1) 0.0221 
PersProd(2) 0.0209 
PersProd(3) 0.3431 
Note: OEP refers to the Operating Expense to Portfolio Ratio. CostEmployee is defined as 
personnel cost per employee. PersProd is Personnel Productivity and refers to the ratio of 
credit clients over total employees. 
 Appendix 4. Significance Levels & P-values 
Significance levels explain what margin of error we accept in committing type 1 errors. Type 
1 errors are incurred when we reject a null hypothesis that is actually correct. A 5 % 
significance level signify that we accept that there is a 5 % probability of committing a type 1 
error. When we reduce the probability of committing a type 1 error, we need to accept a greater 
probability of conducting a type 2 error. A type 2 error occurs when we do not reject the null 
hypothesis, even though the hypothesis is wrong. A type 1 error is more severe than a type 2 
error as we run the risk of claiming an effect that does not exist, as opposed to failing to detect 
an actual effect. P-values relate to significance levels in the following way: If the p-value is 
lower than the chosen significance level, we reject the null hypothesis (Løvås, 1999). In this 
thesis, we operate with three different significance levels, 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %-level. 
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